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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 




BURNS CONCRETE, INC., and 















--------- ----- ) 
Case No. CV-2016-3413 
Docket No. 45184 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL 
******** * ***** 
Appeal from the District Court of the 
Seventh Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
in and for the County of Bonneville 
HONORABLE DANE H. WATKINS, District Judge. 
Lindsey Romankiw 
980 Pier View Drive, Suite B 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402-291 3 
Attorney f or Respondents 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
Robert Burns 
800 W. Main Street, Suite 1300 
Boise, ID 83702 
Attorney for Appellants 
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Seventh Judicial District Court - Bonneville County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2016-0003413-OC Current Judge: Dane H Watkins Jr 
Nora A Mulberry, eta l. vs. Burns Concrete, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, etal. 
User: ABIRCH 
























CPETERSON Summons Issued Dane H Watkins Jr 
Dane H Watkins Jr CPETERSON 
CPETERSON 
New Case Filed-Other Claims 
Plaintiff: Mulberry, Nora A Notice Of Appearance Dane H Watkins Jr 
Donald F Carey 
CPETERSON Plaintiff: TN Properties LLC Notice Of 
Appearance Donald F Carey 
Dane H Watkins Jr 
CPETERSON Filing: AA- All initial civil case filings in District Dane H Watkins Jr 














H( 1) Paid by: Carey Perkins LLP Receipt 
number: 0027648 Dated: 6/29/2016 Amount: 
$221 .00 (Check) For: Mulberry, Nora A (plaintiff) 
and TN Properties LLC (plaintiff) 
Verified Complaint for Declaratory Judgment Dane H Watkins Jr 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any Dane H Watkins Jr 
File Or Record By The Clerk, Per Page Paid by: 
Carey Perkins LLP Receipt number: 0027761 
Dated: 6/29/2016 Amount: $4.00 (Cash) 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any Dane H Watkins Jr 
File Or Record By The Clerk, Per Page Paid by: 
Moffatt Thomas Barrett Rock & Fields Receipt 
number: 0028634 Dated: 7/6/2016 Amount: 
$27.00 (Check) 
Affidavit of SeNice - Burns Concrete INC By 
SeNing Kirk Burns 06/29/2016 
Affidavit of SeNice - 07/06/16 Linda Wilkins 
Defendant: Burns Concrete, Inc Notice Of 
Appearance Robert B Burns 
Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other 
than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: Burns 
Concrete, Inc (defendant) Receipt number: 
0029334 Dated: 7/11/2016 Amount: $136.00 
(Check) For: Burns Concrete, Inc (defendant) 
Dane H Watkins Jr 
Dane H Watkins Jr 
Dane H Watkins Jr 
Dane H Watkins Jr 
Defendant: Canyon Cove Development Company Dane H Watkins Jr 
LLP Notice Of Appearance Robert B Burns 
Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other Dane H Watkins Jr 
than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: Canyon 
Cove Development Company LLP (defendant) 
Receipt number: 0031134 Dated: 7/21/2016 
Amount: $136.00 (Check) For: Canyon Cove 
Development Company LLP (defendant) 
Answer Dane H Watkins Jr 
Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling Conference Dane H Watkins Jr 
10/13/2016 08:30 AM) 
Notice of Hearing Dane H Watkins Jr 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 09/22/2016 09:30 Dane H Watkins Jr 
AM) P - Mtn Partial Summary Judgment 
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Seventh Judicial District Court - Bonneville County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2016-0003413-OC Current Judge: Dane H Watkins Jr 
Nora A Mulberry, etal. vs . Burns Concrete, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, etal. 
User: ABI RCH 































Plaintiff: Mulberry, Nora A Notice Of Appearance Dane H Watkins Jr 
Dina L Sallak 
Plaintiff: TN Properties LLC Notice Of 
Appearance Dina L Sallak 
Motion For Partial Summary Judgment 
Memorandum In Support Of Motion For Partial 
Summary Judgment 
Dane H Watkins Jr 
Dane H Watkins Jr 
Dane H Watkins Jr 
TCORONA Notice Of Service Defendants' Third Dane H Watkins Jr 
Supplemental Answers And Responses To 
Plaintiffs First Set Of Interrogatories And 
Requests For Production 
CPETERSON Notice Of Hearing 09/22/2016@ 9:30 AM RE: Dane H Watkins Jr 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 










Order Granting Motion For Leave To Appear 
Telephonically 
Affidavit Of Linda Wilkins 
Dane H Watkins Jr 
Dane H Watkins Jr 
Affidavit Of Kirk Burns Dane H Watkins Jr 
Memorandum In Opposition To Plaintiffs' Motion Dane H Watkins Jr 
For Partial Summary Judgment 
Order Granting Motion For Leave To Appear 
Telephonically 
Dane H Watkins Jr 
Motion For Leave To Appear Telephonically For Dane H Watkins Jr 
Hearing On Summary Judgment 
Minute Entry Dane H Watkins Jr 
Hearing type: Motion 
Hearing date: 9/22/2016 
Time: 9:00 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: Cassie Carter 
Tape Number: 
Party: Burns Concrete, Inc, Attorney: Robert Burm 
Party: Canyon Cove Development Company LLP, 
Attorney: Robert Burns 
Party: Nora Mulberry, Attorney: Dina Sallak 
Party: TN Properties LLC, Attorney: Dina Sallak 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Dane H Watkins Jr 
09/22/2016 09:30 AM: District Court Hearing Heh 
Court Reporter: Amy Bland 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: P - Mtn Partial Summary Judgment 
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Seventh Judicial District Court - Bonneville County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2016-0003413-OC Current Judge: Dane H Watkins Jr 
Nora A Mulberry, etal. vs. Burns Concrete, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, etal. 
User: ABIRCH 
Nora A Mulberry, TN Properties LLC vs. Burns Concrete, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, Canyon Cove Development 
Company LLP 
Date Code User Judge 
10/13/2016 MINE CARTER Minute Entry Dane H Watkins Jr 
Hearing type: Scheduling Conference 
Hearing date: 10/13/2016 
Time: 9:09 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: Cassie Carter 
Tape Number: 
Party: Burns Concrete, Inc, Attorney: Robert Burm 
Party: Canyon Cove Development Company LLP, 
Attorney: Robert Burns 
Party: Nora Mulberry, Attorney: Dina Sallak 
Party: TN Properties LLC, Attorney: Dina Sallak 
DCHH CARTER Hearing result for Scheduling Conference Dane H Watkins Jr 
scheduled on 10/13/2016 08:30 AM: District 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Amy Bland 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: 
11/10/2016 MEMO CARTER Memorandum Decision and Order RE: Motion for Dane H Watkins Jr 
Partial Summary Judgment 
12/30/2016 MOTN TCORONA Defendant's Motion For Reconsideration Of Dane H Watkins Jr 
Memorandum Decision And Order Re: Motion For 
Partial Summary Judgment 
MEMO TCORONA Memorandum In Support Of Defendant's Motion Dane H Watkins Jr 
For Reconsideration 
1/11/2017 HRSC CARTER Hearing Scheduled (Motion 03/02/2017 09:00 Dane H Watkins Jr 
AM) D - Mtn for Reconsideration 
1/12/2017 MOTN CARTER Motion for Leave to Appear Telephonically for Dane H Watkins Jr 
Hearing on Defendant's Motion for 
Reconsideration of Memorandum Decision and 
Order RE: Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
NOTH CARTER Notice Of Hearing RE: Motion for Reconsideration Dane H Watkins Jr 
of Memorandum Decision and Order RE: Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment 
MEMO JNICHOLS Memorandum In Opposition To Defendants' Dane H Watkins Jr 
Motion For Reconsideration 
1/13/2017 ORDR CARTER Order Granting Motion for Leave to Appear Dane H Watkins Jr 
Telephonically 
2/15/2017 AFFD CPETERSON Second Affidavit of Kirk Burns Dane H Watkins Jr 
2/24/2017 RESP TCORONA Reply In Support Of Defendants' Motion For Dane H Watkins Jr 
Reconsideration 
2/28/2017 MOTN JNICHOLS Plaintiffs Motion To Attend Motion Telephonically Dane H Watkins Jr 
3/2/2017 ORDR CARTER Order Granting Motion to Attend Hearing Dane H Watkins Jr 
Telephonically 
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Minute Entry Dane H Watkins Jr 
Hearing type: Motion 
Hearing date: 3/2/2017 
Time: 9:01 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: Cassie Carter 
Tape Number: 
Party: Burns Concrete, Inc., an Idaho 
Corporation, Attorney: Robert Burns 
Party: Canyon Cove Development Company LLP, 
Attorney: Robert Burns 
Party: Nora Mulberry, Attorney: Dina Sallak 
Party: TN Properties LLC, Attorney: Dina Sallak 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Dane H Watkins Jr 
03/02/2017 09:00 AM: District Court Hearing Hele 
Court Reporter: Amy Bland 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: D - Mtn for Reconsideration 
Memorandum Decision And Order RE: Motion for Dane H Watkins Jr 
Reconsideration 
Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss for Mootness of Dane H Watkins Jr 
Remaining Claims 
Order Dismissing Plaintiffs' Remaining Claims as Dane H Watkins Jr 
Moot 
Judgment 
Case Status Changed: Closed 
Dane H Watkins Jr 
Dane H Watkins Jr 
Civil Disposition entered for: Burns Concrete, Inc., Dane H Watkins Jr 
an Idaho Corporation,, Defendant; Canyon Cove 
Development Company LLP, Defendant; 
Mulberry, Nora A, Plaintiff; TN Properties LLC, 
Plaintiff. Filing date: 4/27/2017 
Stipulation Extending time for Defendants' Dane H Watkins Jr 
Response To Plaintiffs' Memorandum Of Costs 
Stipulation Extending Time For Defendants' Dane H Watkins Jr 
Response To Plaintiffs' Memorandum Of Costs 
Plaintiff's Motion For Costs And Attorney's Fees Dane H Watkins Jr 
Memorandum Of Costs Dane H Watkins Jr 
Affidavit Of Dina L Sallak In Support Of Plaintiff's Dane H Watkins Jr 
Motion For Costs And Attorney's Fees And 
Memorandum Of Costs 
Filing: L4 - Appeal , Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Dane H Watkins Jr 
Supreme Court Paid by: Burns, Robert B 
(attorney for Burns Concrete, Inc., an Idaho 
Corporation,) Receipt number: 0025786 Dated: 
6/5/2017 Amount: $129.00 (Check) For: Burns 
Concrete , Inc., an Idaho Corporation, (defendant) 
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Nora A Mulberry, etal. vs. Burns Concrete, Inc. , an Idaho Corporation, etal. 







































Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 25798 Dated 
6/5/2017 for 100.00) 
Case Status Changed: Closed pending clerk 
action 
Notice Of Appeal 
Appealed To The Supreme Court 
Judge 
Dane H Watkins Jr 
Dane H Watkins Jr 
Dane H Watkins Jr 
Dane H Watkins Jr 
Defendant's Motion of Defendants to Disallow Dane H Watkins Jr 
Costs and Attorney Fees 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 07/20/2017 08:30 Dane H Watkins Jr 
AM) Motion of Defendants to Disallow Costs and 
Attorney Fees 
Motion For Leave to Appear Telephonically for Dane H Watkins Jr 
Hearing on Motion of Defendants to Disallow 
Costs and Attorney Fees 
Notice Of Hearing RE: Motion of Defendants to Dane H Watkins Jr 
Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees 
Order Granting Motion For Leave To Appear Dane H Watkins Jr 
Telephonically 
Clerk's Certificate of Appeal Dane H Watkins Jr 
Appealed To The Supreme Court Dane H Watkins Jr 
TCORONA Memorandum In Support Of Motion Of Dane H Watkins Jr 
Defendants To Disallow Costs And Attorney Fees 
CPETERSON Plaintiffs Reply in Support of Motion for Costs Dane H Watkins Jr 
and Attorney's Fees and Motion to Strike 
Defendants' Memoarndum in Support of Motion to 
Disallow Costs and Attorneys Fees and 
BJENNINGS Reply in Support of Motion of Defendants to Dane H Watkins Jr 
Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees 
CPETERSON Plaintiffs Notice of Attorney Name Change Dane H Watkins Jr 
CARTER Minute Entry 
Hearing type: Motion 
Hearing date: 7/20/2017 
Time: 8:30 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: 
Minutes Clerk: Cassie Carter 
Tape Number: 
Party: Burns Concrete, Inc., an Idaho 
Corporation, Attorney: Robert Burns 
Party: Canyon Cove Development Company LLP, 
Attorney: Robert Burns 
Party: Nora Mulberry, Attorney: Dina 
Sallak-Windes 
Party: TN Properties LLC, Attorney: Dina 
Sallak-Windes 
Dane H Watkins Jr 
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Seventh Judicial District Court - Bonneville County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2016-0003413-OC Current Judge: Dane H Watkins Jr 
Nora A Mulberry, etal. vs. Burns Concrete, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, etal. 
User: ABIRCH 
Nora A Mulberry, TN Properties LLC vs. Burns Concrete, Inc., an Idaho Corporation, Canyon Cove Development 
Company LLP 













Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Dane H Watkins Jr 
07/20/2017 08:30 AM: District Court Hearing Hel< 
Court Reporter: Amy Bland 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: Motion of Defendants to Disallow 
Costs and Attorney Fees 
Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Attorney Dane H Watkins Jr 
Fees and Costs $11 ,673.50 
Amended Notice Of Appeal 
Notice of Firm Change (Carey Romankiw) 
Dane H Watkins Jr 
Dane H Watkins Jr 
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( 
Donald F. Carey, ISB No. 4392 
Lindsey R. Romankiw, ISB No. 2468 
CAREY PERKINS LLP 
980 Pier View Drive, Suite B 
P. 0. Box 51388 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402-4918 
Telephone: (208) 529-0000 
Facsimile: (208) 529-0005 
case Assigned to 
Dane H. Wat1dns, Jr. 
BC.mEVILLE COUNTY. IOA HO 
2016 JUN 29 AH 9: 59 






IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF fDAHO, IN AND 
FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
ORA A. MULBERRY and TN 
PROPERTIES LLC, 
Case No. f!k1u '34 / 3 




BURNS CO CRETE INC., and CANYON 
COVE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, LLP, 
Defendants. 
Plaintiff, Nora A. Mulbeny, by and through her counsel Carey Perkins LLP, for a 
cause of action alleges as follows: 
1. That Nora A. Mulbeny is a resident of Bonneville County, Idaho. She is the 
sole owner of TN Properties LLC, an Idaho limited liability company. 
2. The properties at issue in this Declaratory Judgment action are located in 
Bonneville County, Idaho. 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT - 1 
9
3. The Defendant, Burns Concrete, Inc. , has its primary place of business located 
in Bom1eville County, Idaho. 
4. The Defendant, Canyon Cove Development Company, LLP, has its principal 
place of business located in Bonneville County, Idaho. 
5. Venue is of this action is proper in Bonneville County, Idaho. 
6. This court has subject matter jurisdiction over this di spute pursuant to Idaho 
Code section I 0- 1201 et seq. 
7. The court has personal jurisdiction over these Defendants. 
8. That TN Properties LLC, owns properties listed in that certain wananty deed 
attached hereto and incorporated by reference as Exhibit 1. At issue in this litigation are those 
properties described as "Parcel One" and "Parcel Two." 
9. That previously Nora A. Mulbeny, and her husband Theodore "Ted" E. 
Mulberry, (deceased) were the owners of a certain property identified more specifically in attached 
Exhibit 2. That on or about January 26 1999, Plaintiff, Nora A. Mulberry, and her husband entered 
into a Commercial/Investment Real Estate Purchase And Sale Agreement with an entity identified 
as Canyon Cove Development Company(' Canyon Cove"), a limited partnership. See Exhibit 3. 
The real estate at issue in said Exhibi t 3 is the real estate that is more fully described in attached 
xhibit 2. The agreed purchase price for said real estate was $515,000. Id. 
10. Plaintiff Nora A. Mulberry, and her deceased husband, Theodore "Ted ' E. 
Mulberry attended a closing for the propetiy listed in exhibit 2, on March 18 1999 . At closing, and 
at no time prior to closing, sellers were presented with a document styled ' Addendum' which set 
forth additional te1m s and conditions of the ale one of which was the granting of a First Right of 
Refusal. See Exhibit 4. The actual terms of the First Right of Refusal were memorialized in a 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT- 2 
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separate docwnent styled "Undivided Right of First Refusal to Acquire Interest in Real Property." 
See Exhibit 5. The First Right of Refusal is dated March 18, 1999, the exact date of closing of the 
real estate transaction memorialized in Exhibit 3. 
11. The Undivided Right of First Refusal to Acquire Interest in Real Property, 
Exhibit 5, may encumber those parcels listed as Parcel 1 and Parcel 2, set forth on Exhibit 1 to this 
Complaint. 
12. Twelve days after the closing of the real estate sale set forth above, on or 
about March 30, 1999, Canyon Cove assigned its rights and obligations to defendant, Bums 
Concrete, Inc. , under that ce1tain farm lease dated March 18, 1999, the Undivided Right of First 
Refusal attached hereto and incorporated by reference as Exhibit 5, and the obligations and 
responsibilities of Canyon Cove, LLP under the foregoing instruments, together with an agreement 
to indenmify Canyon Cove of any liability which may result as a result of Burns' failure to comply 
with the obligations hereunder. See Exhibit 6. 
13. Petitioners contend that there was a failure of consideration with respect to 
the Undivided Right of First Refusal to Acquire Interest in Real Property for property which was 
not the subject matter of the initial real estate transaction between the Plaintiff, Nora A. Mull berry, 
and her deceased husband, Theodore ' Ted ' E. Mulberry, and Canyon Cove. Therefore, Plaintiff 
contends that the Undivided Right of First Refusal is void or voidable for failure of consideration. 
14. Petitioner contends that the manner in which the Addendum Exhibit 4, and 
the Undi vided Right of First Refusal, Exhibit 5, were presented, at closing, and with no prior notice 
and without any real opportunity to have tho e documents reviewed by counsel and without any 
opportunity to seek independent consultation of the effect of that Undivided Right of First Refusal 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT- 3 
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on the adjacent prope1iies not otherwise the subject of the real estate transaction was and is 
unconscionable as a matter of equity and should be set aside. 
15. In the alternative Plaintiff contends that the Undivided Right of First Refusal, 
by its terms only implicates properties referenced therein in the context of a 'sale" and is not 
effective nor is it binding on any subsequent owners of the property who take by inter vivos gift, or 
through a bequest made in a testamentary instrument or by intestate succession. 
16. The subject land sale was a commercial transaction by its definition. Plaintiff 
should be awarded attorneys fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 10-1210 12-120(3), 12-121, 
12-123, and Rule 54(d)(I) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
Wherefore Petitioner prays for an Order of this Court as fo llows: 
1. Finding that the Undivided Right of F jrst Refusal is vo id or voidable for 
fai lure of consideration; 
2. Finding that the Undivided Right of First Refusal to Acquire Interest in Real 
Propet.iy is void based on equity given the unconscionable manner of its presentation; 
3. Finding that if not void bas don failure of consideration or based on equity, 
that its affect is limited to sales of the subject property, and is in no way binding on inter vivos gift 
transfers or intestate succession owner of the affected property; 
4 . For an award of attorneys fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 10-1210, 
12-1 20(3) 12- 121 , 12-1 23 I.R.C.P. 54(d)(i). 
5. For other and ft.niher relief as the Court deems appropriate under the 
circumstances. 
DATED this J£t'day of June, 2016 
V RJFI D COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY JUDGMENT - 4 
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( 
CAREY PERKINS LLP 
8Y~u~::::::::o~+-----
oona1d F. Carey, 
Attorneys for Pia.inti s 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Bonneville ) 
Nora A. Mulberry, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states : 
That she is the Plaintiff and the owner of TN Properties LLC in the above-entitled 
action, that she has read the foregoing Verified Complaint and for Declaratory Judgment, and based 
upon her information and belief, the allegations contained therein are true. 
~va~ ora A. Mulberry 




STATE OF IDAHO 
/ 
Notary Public for Idah.9 
Residing at PJ;11,JttVt{f.l C~ 
Commission expires /0 l1P/tO 
f. 






-+-a....,..~q,,,.,'4/-~ . ...._. -E--1_z_. 2005. 2. Pa¥s , 
BONH£t1ILLE (JJIJNT'i RECORDER 
196121 AUG1?705 P 4 2"7 
Grantor: Theodore E. Mulberry and Nora Mulberry 
(a/k/a Nora A. Mulberry) , husband and wife. 
Current Address: 2521 W. 81 S. , Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Grantee: TN Properties LLC , an Idaho limited liability 
company. 
Current Address: 2521 W. 81 S., Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
3. Property 
Idaho County: Bonneville 
Transferred interest: Grantors entire fee simple 
Description: 
Parcel 1 -//4/j,(£,. pbee._ 
Beginning at a point 25 feet South and 25 feet West 
of the Northeast corner of Section 15, Township 1 
North, Range 37 East of the Boise Meridian, in 
Idaho; thence South 1751.28 feet, paralleling 
Section line between Sections 14 and 15; thence at 
right angles to said Section line and West 2483.7 
feet to a point in the East line of the Oregon Short 
Line Railroad right of way; thence Northeasterly 
along said right of way line 2019 feet; thence East 
and parallel to North line of Section 15, 1496 feet, 
more or less, to the point of beginning, containing 80 
acres, more or less. 
Parcel 2 - So~ 
Beginning at a point 25 feet West and 1776.28 feet 
South of the Northeast corner of Section 15, in 
Township 1 North, Range 37 East of the Boise 
Meridian, thence continuing South paralleling the 
East line of Section 15, 888. 72 feet, more or less, to 
the Southeast corner of the Northeast Quarter of 
said Section 15, thence West 2895 feet to a point in 
the East line of the Oregon Short Line Railroad right 
of way, thence Northeasterly along said right of way 
line 1024.6 feet, thence in an Easterly direction 
2483.7 feet to the place of beginning , containing 
56.8 acres, more or less. 
Parcel 3 - Qu£i} For,.""' 
Beginning at the Southwest corner of Section 15, 
Township 1 North, Range 37 E.B.M. , and running 
thence East along the South line of said section to 
the intersection thereof with the Westerly line of the 
right of way of the Oregon Short Line Railroad; 
thence Northeasterly along the West line of said 
rai lroad right of way, approximately 1561 feet to the 
intersection thereof with the West line of the East 
Half of the Southwest Quarter (E1/2SW 1/4) of said 
Section 15, thence North along the West line of the 
East Half of the West Half (E1/2W1/2) of said 
Section . ,.,, approximately 2486 feet to its 
intersection with the Southerly line of the right of way 
of the Snake River Valley Canal; thence in a 
Southwesterly direction along the Southerly line of 
said right of way of the said Snake River Valley 
Canal to the diversion gates on said canal which are 
located within Lot 1 of Section 16, Township and 
Range aforesaid, thence in a Southeasterly direction 
along the Easterly line of the right of way of said 
canal to its intersection with the South line of said 
Section 16, thence East on the South line of said 
Section 16, approximately 480 feet to the place of 
beg inning . Subject to easements and highways. 
(The property located in Section 16 above, is within 
the boundaries of Bingham County.) 
LESS: 
Commencing at the Southwest Corner of Section 
Fifteen (15), Township One (1) North, Range Thirty-
Seven (37) East, Boise Meridian, and runn-ing South 
89"29' East 515.68 feet along the South side of 
Section Fifteen (15) ; thence North 28°53'45" East 
66.56 feet to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING, 
thence North 28°53'45" East 188.74 feet; thence 
North 66°48'30" West 313.46 feet; thence South 
23"11 '30" West 296.68 feet; thence South 87°05' 
East 314.16 feet to the TRUE POINT OF 
BEGINNING. 
The above described land contains 1.68 acres more 
or less. 
LESS: 
Part of Section 15, Township 1 North, Range 37 
East of the Boise Baseline and Meridian, Bonneville 
County, Idaho described as: 
Beginning at a point that is N00"02'50"W 2151 .62 
feet along the Section line and N32°06'03"E 572.32 
feet from the Southwest Corner of said Section 15, 
and running thence S89'20'47"E 250.00 feet; thence 
North 316.09 feet; thence S46°46'26''W 178.85 feet; 
thence S32"06'03"W 225.17 feet to the point of 
beginning. 
TUGETHER WITH a 50 foot w1de e,rsement all on-
the Southerly and Westerly sides of the following 
described line: 
Beginning at a point that is N00"02'50"W 2151.62 
feet along the Section line and N32"06'03"E 572.32 
feet and S89"20'47"E 200.00 feet, all from the 
Southwest Corner of Section 15, Township 1 North, 
Range 37 East of the Boise Baseline and Meridian, 
Bonneville County, Idaho, and runn ing thence 
S89'20'47"E 813.99 feet to the East line of the West 
Half of the Southwest Quarter of said Section 15; 
thence s00·00·39"E along said East line to its 
intersection with the Northerly right of way line of 






Township 1 North, Range 37 East of the Boise Meri~ian, Bonneville County, Idaho. 
Section 11: Wl/2 El/2 SWl/4, and 
The East 1155 feet of the West Half of the Southwest Quarter. 
EXCEPTING THEREFROM ALL OF THE FOLLOWING DESCRIBED PROPERTIES: 
a. Beginning at the Southwest Corner of Section 11, Township 1 North, Range 37 East of t~e Boise 
Meridian, Bonneville County, Idaho; and running N89°48'E 501.45 feet along the South.side of 
.Section 11 to tbe TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING; thence N89°48'E 290.80 feet nlong snid Section 
line; thence North 362.40 feet; thence N79°30'W 165.10 feet; thence N88°00'W 128.55 feet; thence 
South 397.99 feet to the point of_ beginning. 
b. Beginning at the Southwest Corner of Section 11, Township 1 North, Range 37 East of the Boise 
Meridian, Bonneville County, Idaho; and running thence N89°48'E 185.42 feet along the South side 
of said Section 11 to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING; thence N89°48'E 316.00 feet along said 
Section line; thence North 397.99 feet; thence N82°28'20"W 319.74 feet; thence S0°07'40"E 440.98 
feet to the true point of beginning. 
c. Beginning at the Southwest Corner of Section 11, Township 1 North, Range 37 East of the Boise 
Meridian, Bonneville County, Idaho; and running N89°48'E 185.42 feet along the South side of said 
Section 11 to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING; which point is also the Southwest Corner of that 
parcel of realty described by that certain Warrnnty deed <lated May 9, 1983, recorded May 11, 1983 
as Instrument No. 641822 of the : public records of said Bonneville County, Idaho; thence 
N0°07'40"W 440.98 feet to the Northwest Corner of said realty; thence West 20 feet, more or less, 
to the Western boundary of that parcel of realty described by that certain Warrnnty deeu dated 
December 21, 1989, recorded the same date as Instrument No. 778822 of the public records of said 
Bonneville County, Idaho; thence S0°17'08"W along said Western boundary 441 feet, more or less, 
to the Southwest Corner of said parcel of realty; thence N89°48'E along the Southern boundary of 
said parcel of realty 20.5 feet, more or less, to the true point of beginning. 
d. Beginning at a point that is S89.48'00"W 911.66 feet along the Section line from the South Quarter 
Corner of Section 11, Township 1 North, Range 37 East of the Boise Baseline anu Meridian, 
Bonneville County, Idaho, running thence N00°12'00"W 239.50 feet; thence N89.49'39"W 181.44 







































COl\l1MERCIAL/INVESTMENT REAL ESTATE 
PURCHASE AND SALE AGREEMENT 
iOUN. ttOVl1NO 
Ol"PO"TUNIT'f 
45017 ID# __ ---'--;..._ _____ _ tc/~,e; Ev/2 . Idaho 4A,v P< 6 , 1s.f!l 
1. REAL ESTATE OFFICES: 
Selling Agency kr:0/c(L :14-e..l.Cr Listing Agency _________________ _ 
Listing Agent Name ________________ _ Sell ing Agent Name wh " ► le -f l t/'.\, 
Phone # (Office) _______ (Home) _ ______ _ Phone # (Office) _________ (Home) ________ _ 
2. REPRESENTATION CONFIRMATION: 
3. 
4. 
In this transaction, the brokerage(s) involved had the following relationship(s) with the BUYER ("agent• or "nonagent" or "limited dual agent"): 
Listing broker acted as a(n) /1 J.___ For the buyer. 
Selling broker acted as a(n) CU S f-¢ /11., e J<_ For the buyer. 
In t his transaction, the brokerage(s) involved had the following relationship(sl with the SELLER ("agent• or "nonagenr or "l imited dual agent"): 
Listing broker acted as a(n) CJ ~ · For the Seller. 
Selling broker acted as a(n) 01 ~ tDH:ic: A, For the Seller , 
Each party signing th is document confi rms that he or she has rece ived, read and understood the Agency Disclosure brochure and has elected the 
relationship confirmed above. In addition, each party confirms that the broker's agency office policy was made available for inspection and review. 
EACH PARTY UNDERSTANDS THAT HE OR SHE IS A "CUSTOMER" AND IS NOT REPRESENTED BY A BROKER UNLESS THERE IS A SIGNED 
WRITTEN AGREEMENT FOR AGENCY REPRESENTATION, 
BUYER: ~ tµntJ Ca t.Je. & LtMttJ Nn-4"'"" -r-il, I) 
_______________________________________ •_(hereinafter called "Buyer") agrees 
to purchase and the undersigned Seller agrees to sel l the following described real estate hereinafter referred to as "Property." 
PROPERTY ADDRESS AND LEGAL DESCRIPTIO~ 1: Property commonly known as n1 u,,[ Be..u~ Fl'f,gm 
6. EARNEST MONEY: 
a) Buyer hereby deposits as Earnest Money and a receipt is hereby acknowledged of......I.---1u.:~ ...... ~;.w:.-...lili..lllc:l!'-LJ~..J!!:l~~-~u..i.s;.L-_ 
Dollars($ '6;CeC. ~ ). Evidenced by : 0 Cash IJ Check O Cashier's Check O Note or --- .. 
bl Earnest Money to be deposited in trust account upon acc_eptance by all parties apd shali be held by k- .4/CA- :R;;,-.(,""'Lr=------
for the benefit of the parties hereto. The responsible Broker shall be Lt.!},(!), )ti de 6 ~ "'r 
7. INCLUDED ITEMS: All attached floor coverings, attached television antennae, s~~ish(es) and receiving equipment, attached plumbing, 
bathroom and lighting fixtures, window screens, screen doors, storm windows. stnrm rlnnrc ... ,n,.~•·· ------'- --
1a 1 -:,, ♦ .-.r ~ .......... : ... - - -
19
85 PROPERTY ADDRESS: ?P GIN 3ZE // ID# __ 4_,a....5.:;c_.Oce-..;1=-7 __ _ 
86 11 . ESCROW /COLLECTION: If a long-term escrow/collection is involved, then the escrow/collection holder shall be _________ _ 
67 Each party agrees to pay one-half of escrow/collection fees. 
oo 12. CLOSING DATE: On or before the closing date, Buyer and Seller~~all d~~it with }~b,~?~g Agency all funds and instruments necessary 
89 to complete the sale. The closing date shall be no later than h1JZttq~ ~ c<Zi L . "Closing Date" means the date on which 




Taxes and water asses_sments (using the l~s'. available assessment as a basis). rent~, insur~e .Plemiu!J;lll, interest and res rve on 
encumbrances or obligations assumed and ut1l1t1es shall be prorated as of the day of closing or_..::-;>c../'-=.:...; /..;;,c;;."-;..;::;--".-.-+'-''"""'l,._..s;;.....,c.-......__.._......,....__ 
. Any tenant deposits held by Seller shall be credited to Buyer at closing. 
ss 14. DEFAULT: If Buyer defaults in the performance of t his Agreement, Seller has the option: (1) accepting the Earnest Money as liquidated damages 
96 or (2) pursuing any other lawful right or remedy to which Seller may be entitled . If Seller elects to proceed under (1). Seller shall make demand upon 
the holder of the Earnest Money. upon which demand said holder shall pay from the Earnest Money the costs incurred by Se ller's Broker on behalf 
of Seller and Buyer related to the transact ion, including, without limitation, the costs of title insurance , escrow tees, credit report fees, inspection 
fees and attorney's fees; and sa id holder shall pay any balance of the Earnest Money, one-half to Seller and one-hal f to Seller's Broker , provided 
that the amount to be paid to Seller's Broker shall not exceed the Broker' s agreed to commission. Seller and Buyer specifically acknowledge and 
aqree that if Seller elects to accept the Earnest Money as liqu idated damages, such shall be Seller's sole and exclusive remedy, and such shall not 
be consIdertHl i1 pf:ll\iilly ur lurtt1ILurt, . If St1lltir lllecti; tu prucm,d u11llt1r l:l}, tile holdtlr al u,e tamest Money shall be entitled to piiy the costs incurred 
by Seller's Broker on behalf of Seller and Buyer related to the transaction , including, without limitation, the costs of brokerage fee, title insurance, 
escrow fees, credit report fees, inspection fees and attorney' s fees, with any balance of the Earnest Money to be held pending resolution of the 
matter. If Seller defaults, having approved said sale and fails to consummate the same as herein agreed, Buyer' s Earnest Money deposit shall bA 
returned to him/her and Seller shall pay for the costs of title insurance, escrow fees, credit report fees, inspection tees, brokerage fees and attorney's 
















of any controversy regarding the Earnest Money and things of value held by Broker or closing agency, unless mutual written instructions are received 
by the holder of the Earnest Money and things ot value, Broker or closing agency shall not be required to take any action but may await any 
proceeding, or at Broker's or closing agency's option and sole discretion, may interplead all parties and deposit any moneys or things of value into 
a court of competent jurisdiction and shali recover court costs and reasonable attorney's fees. 
113 16 . TITLE CONVEYANCE: Title of Seller is to be conveyed by warranty deed or _______________ deed, and is to be 
114 
115 
marketable and insurable except for rights reserved in federal patents, building or use restrictions, building and zoning regulations and o'rdinances 
of any governmental unit, rights of way and easements established or of record and any other liens, encumbrances or defects approved by Buyer . 
11s 17. RISK OF LOSS: Should the Property be materially damaged by f ire or other cause prior to closing, unless Buyer has taken possession prior to 
117 closing by Agre~ment, this Agreement shall be voidable at t he option of Buyer. 




assume all obligations with respect to t he Property. Seller shall maintain the Property until the closing in its present condition, ordinary wear and 
tear excepted, and loss by casualty. The heating, ventilating, air conditioning, plumbing, elevators. loading doors and electrical systems shall be 
in present operating order and condition at the time of closing, unless otherwise agreed to in writing. 
122' 19. INSPECTION: Buyer hereby acknowledges further that Buyer has not received or re lied upon any statements or representations by the Broker 
123 
124 
or Broker's representatives or by Seller which are not herein expressed. Buyer has entered into this Agreement relying upon information and 
knowledge obtained trorn Buyer' i; own investigation or personal inspection ot the Property . 
125 20 . ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS: / Addit ional provisions of this Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agree ment, if any, are attached hereto by an 
12s Addendum consisting of J1/rlf page(s} . 
121 21. NOTARY PUBLIC: It is recommended signatures be no tarized with a notary statement attached hereto . 
128 22. ENTIRE AGREEMENT : This Agreement, including any Addendums or exhibits, constitutes the entire .A.greement betwP.en the parties and no 
12,; 
130 
warranties, including any warramy oi r.abitao1ii iy, Agrei::rm;ms or representation~ have been made 01 shall be i::11nding upon either party unless herein 
set forth . 
131 23. TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE IN THIS AGREEMENT. 
132 24. ACCEPTANCE: Buyer's offer is made subject to the acceptance of Seller on or before (Date)~LAN /ff'I and /TimRI I~ ;:i,.,. 





This Addendum is executed to clarify the terms of the Commercial Investment Real 
Estate.Purchase and Sale Agreement dated January 26, 1999, with Theodore E. Mulberry and 
Nora A. Mulberry, husband and wife, and Michael Mulberry and Ina Sue Mulberry, husband 
and wife, as Sellers, and Canyon Cove Development Company, LLP, as Buyer. 
1. Irrigation System. 
Approximately one-third (l /3) of the property is irrigated from a pump (the 
South Pump) that lies south of the road, and delivers water to the subject property through 
a buried mainline. The remaining portion of the property is irrigated by a diesel pump (the 
North Pump) that draws water from the ditch along the north end of the property. Sellers 
agree to install a buried mainline from the North Pump to provide water to the portion of the 
property which is presently irrigated from the South Pump. If the North Pump is insufficient 
to provide water pressure to the entire property that is within the specifications for the wheel 
lines, Sellers shall install a larger diesel pump sufficient to provide such water at Sellers' own 
expense, in which case Sellers may retain the existing diesel pump. Seller shall complete the 
requirements of this paragraph by November I, 1999. 
2. Prior Encumbrance. 
A. The Property is subject to a mortgage in favor of Fann Credit Service 
(the "Encumbrance11 ). Buyer does not assume the Encumbrance. Sellers agree to pay all of 
the remaining payments of principal and interest due under the Encumbrance, promptly when 
· the same are required to be paid as set forth in the Escrow Agreement. Sellers also agree to 
make prepayments on the Encumbrance as set forth in the Escrow Agreement. If Buyer shall 
prepay all or any portion of the balance owing to Sellers hereunder, Sellers agree to prepay 
seventy-five percent (75%) of said amount as a prepayment on the Encumbrance. Sellers 
shall pay and discharge the same not later than the date ofBuyer1s final payment to Sellers 
hereunder (whether such be by regularly scheduled installments or by prepayment). Upon 
full payment of the Encumbrance, should Sellers fail to do so, Sellers hereby nominate and 
appoint Buyer as Sellers' attorney-in-fact, with full power and authority to demand and 
receive of any mortgagees or escrow holder, and place of record any and all documents 
necessary to clear the Encumbrance of record, to the same extent as Sellers could have 
personally done. 
B. Sellers authorize the mortgagee to disclose to Buyer any information 
requested by Buyer with respect to the status of the loan account secured by the 
Encumbrance, including without limitation the balance remaining due, whether payments are 
22
current and the amount of any delinquency in payments, the balances held in any reserve 
accounts, and any other information reasonably necessary in order for Buyer to detennine 
whether Sellers have perfonned Sellers' covenants as set forth in the preceding paragraph. 
C. Should Sellers (or any reason breach the covenants set forth herein, and 
should Sellers thereby be in default in payment of any amount due upon the debt secured by 
the Encumbrance, Buyer shall have the right to pay such money as shall be necessary in 
order to correct such default, and prevent a foreclosure of the.Encumbrance (although Buyer 
shall not be obligated to do so). Should Buyer pay any money to correct Sellers' said default 
and to prevent a foreclosure of the Encumbrance, Buyer shall be credited in like amount, as 
of the date such payment was so made by Buyer. The making of any such payment by Buyer 
to correct Sellers' default shall not be deemed a waiver of Buyer's right to bring an 
appropriate legal action against Sellers by reason of Sellers' breach of this contract in 
permitting such default to occur. 
D. If Buyer should do any act that constitutes a breach under the 
Encumbrance, Buyer shall be required to correct such breach ·or to pay the Encumbrance. 
Buyer shall indemnify Sellers of any cost or liability including reasonable attorney fees, 
which Sellers may be required to pay to the mortgage holder as a result of Buyer's default. 
3. Environmental. 
A. Seller represents that as of the date of execution of this agreement Seller 
has no knowledge, after due investigation, of any failure to comply with applicable local, 
State and Federal environmental laws, regulations, ordinances and administrative or judicial 
orders relating to the generation, recycling, reuse, sale,. storage, handling, transport and 
disposal of any hazardous substances, on or involved in or associated with the use of the 
Property. 
B. Seller has no knowledge, after due investigation, of the presence of any 
hazardous substances or toxic substances or hazardous or toxic emissions, or of any spills, 
releases, discharge or disposal of any hazardous substances that have occurred or are 
presently occurring on the Property. 
C. Seller warrants that there are no petroleum or other storage tanks buried 
on the Property. 
D. For purposes of this agreement, "hazardous substances", "toxic 
substances" or "hazardous" or 11toxic11 emissions shall mean any substance or material defined 
or designated as hazardous or toxic waste, hazardous or toxic material, hazardous, toxic or 
radioactive substance or other similar term by any federal , state or local environmental 
2 - ADDENDUM 
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statute, regulation or ordinance presently in effect or that may be promulgated in the future, 
and shall include petroleum or petroleum based products. 
4. Right of First Refusal. The partie~ agree to execute a Right of First Refusal 
in the form attached hereto. 
5. Lease Agreement. The parties agree to execute a Lease Agreement in the 
form attached hereto. 
Dated this /Y day of March, 1999. 
Michael Mulberry 
Ina Sue Mulberry ) 
CANYON COVE DEVELOP:rvIENT 
COMPANY, P 
By: .v 
Wilkins, Managing Partner 
3 - ADDENDUM 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
County of Bonneville ) 
On the \".t~ay of March, 1999, before me, the undersigned, a notary public in and 
for said State, personally appeared Theodore E. Mulberry and Nora A. Mulberry, husband 
and wife, known or identified to me to be the persons whose names are subscribed to the 
within instrument and acknowledged to me that they executed the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal, 
the day and year in this certificate first above written. 
i-. ·_ ' ·- ·- ... -1, t..•._ . . . . : :•;:J 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
County of Bonneville ) 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Idaho Falls, Idaho 
My Commission Expires: \ \'d-...~~t)~ 
\ l 
On the\\ ~ay of March, 1999, before me, the undersigned, a notary public in and 
for said State, personally appeared Michael Mulberry and Ina Sue Mulberry, husband and 
wife, known or identified to me to be the persons whose names are subscribed to the within 
instrument and acknowledged to me that they executed the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal, 
the day and year in this certificate first above written. 
~~~-
Notary Public for Idaho 
(seal) 
r=-·=--=-"'"""""""""'=-==amc=== 
Residing a~ I~aho Fal~s, Idaho l""")s ~ ~ 
My Comm1ss10n Expires: \ ~ ~ 
I NL'!TAAY PUBLIC 
I !..ENOAE J. KATRI 
L _, ____ ~_:~'-TE OF IOAHO 
. -- ~ '"} ~ : '1,; J ,,() Fa i•S, ldaoo 
M: . .. ;.,.:..:ur. S .~" ·-~1 ... •,, . ..!tl 2Cr:JJ 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss .. 
County of Bonneville ) 
On the ~ay of March, ~999, before me the undersigned, a notary public in and 
for said State, personally appeared Linda Wilkins, known or identified to me to be one of the 
partners in the partnership of Canyon Cove Development Company, LLP, and the partner or 
one of the partners who subscribed said partnership name to the foregoing instrument, and 
acknowledged to me that she executed the same in said partnership name. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal 
the day and year in this certificate first above written. 
(seal) 
G:\WPDA TAIGLM\1700\CANCOV.ADO:., 
5 - ADDENDUM 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Idaho Falls, Idaho 
My Commission Expires: \ \ ~% \ ~'t)~ 
\ 7 
~~ .. NOTAAY-PUBUC ··7 
/ t.ENCRE J. KATRI :1 
L. _... .. wsr AfE '?._F IDAHO _J 
~BS!ding at Idaho Fails, ldato 




BONHE'.'ILLE (outlTY RECORE 
991908 MAR19"39 AHiOC6 
bG \- \'\iC\\ 
C{q;r:,-o~ 
UNDIVIDED RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL 
TO ACQUIRE INTEREST IN REAL PROPERTY 
This Right of First Refusal is made and entered into as of the \~ day of March, 
1999, by and between Theodore E. Mulberry and Nora A. Mulberry, husband and wife, as 
Sellers, and Canyon Cove Development Company, LLP, as Buyers. 
WITNESSETH 
1. For adequate consideration, Sellers hereby grant to the Buyer a right of first 
refusal to acquire the Sellers' undivided imerest in and to the real property hereafter described 
on the same terms, conditions, and provisions as the Sellers might intend to sell and convey 
said interest to any third person hereafter. 
2. Should the Sellers hereafter intend to sell in good faith and convey said 
premises they will first offer the same to the Buyer by a written notice containing all of the 
terms, conditions, and provisions by which they intend to sell in good faith the same to said 
third person. Buyer shall then have five (5) days from the date such notice is received to 
accept or refuse said offer. 
3. Should the Buyer decline the offer, and the sale to the third party, for any 
reason not occur, then this option of first refusal should then be renewed and shall apply to 
any subsequent sale to a third party. 
4. Shall Buyer fail or refuse to accept any such offer within their time limit stated, 
then any interest of Buyer in the subject property shall cease and terminate as to the sale to 
the intended third party should it occur. This option agreement may be recorded in 
Bonneville County, Idaho. Thereafter, Sellers may record a notice in Bonneville County, 
Idaho, shO\ving the date on which tliey gave their notice to Buyers, in order to give record 
notice of the beginning of the stated notice time period. 
5. The real property to which this option of first refusal applies is located in 
Bonneville County and is described as follows: 
Sellers' right, title and interest in and to: 
Beginning at a point 25 feet West and 177 6 .2 8 feet South of the 
Northeast comer of Section 15, in Township 1 North, Range 37 
East of the Boise Meridian, thence continuing South paralleling 
the East line of said Section 15, 888.72 feet, more or less, to the 
28
SoutheastcomeroftheN.E. 1/4 of said Section 15; thence West 
2895 feet to a point in the East line of the Oregon Short Line 
Railroad right of way, thence Northeasterly along said right of 
way line 1024.6 feet, thence in an Easterly direction 2483 .7 feet 
to the place of beginning. ALSO: Beginning at a point 25 feet 
South and 25 feet West of the Northeast comer of Section 15, 
Township 1 North, Range 37 East of the Boise Meridian; thence 
South 17 51.28 feet, paralleling Section line between Sections 14 
and 15, thence right angles to said Section line and West 2483.7 
feet to a point in the East line of the Oregon Short Line Railroad 
right of way; thence Northeasterly along said right of way line 
2091 feet; thence East and parallel to North line of Section 15, 
1496 feet to the place of beginning. 
SUBJECT TO: 
a. General taxes for the year 1999 and all subsequent years. 
b. These premises are situated within the boundaries of the Idaho 
Irrigation District and are subject to the assessments thereof for the year 
1999 and all subsequent years. 
c. All easements and rights-of-way of record or those appearing on the 
land which affect the described property . 
d. Patent reservations, mineral, oil, gravel, and other reservations, all 
building codes, laws, and zoning ordinances affecting the described 
premises. 
Dated this / :i date of :March, 1999. 
Nofa A. Mulberry 
2 - UNDIVIDED RJGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL TO ACQUIRE INTEREST IN REAL PROPERTY 
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. ., 
CANYON co~ DEVELOP:MENT COMP~? . 
By (._.L1)J1/J{l lcu{io .
Linda Wilkins, Managing Partner 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
County of Bonneville ) 
On the ~-¾ay of March, 1999, before me, the undersigned. a notary public in and 
for said State, personally appeared Theodore E . Mulberry and Nora A. Mulberry, husband 
and wife, known or identified to me to be the persons whose names are subscribed to the 
within instrument and acknowledged to me that they executed the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal, 




Notary Public for Idah~ 
Residing at Idaho Falls, Idaho 
My Commission Expires: "' \ c1i \ctS)CJ~ 
I INSTRUMENT NO. ~ --.........,..,......,... DATE - ~9_..=_ 
1,· 11-; ST. CODE '1 ~ t -
f !M/\C~E-.£; PGS =-"'?t:-- -
l r: ·:E f-a2-l , . -----
! f,T,'\TF (Y lD1' H() ) I 1:t) ; ,"'!: - ~-.c: 1,.. :·\t,,_~ .;~;r.:- •, , 1 • ; c'- ) S$ 
-..J ._ -...., •• • • _ _..1 "'' ••-._ " • 1-L. I. 1 ··, .,-,,y i: 'irH•-v -,,-:,t the wil.l'J!l 
I :,,:;' '· ... -:,,. .. w,ts 10corr.1~d. 
1 ;10 ·- : !_0 -:gmore. 
3 - UNDIVIDED RIGHT OF FIRST RE~~J<.t!l~\::~RE n:!EREST IN . AL PROPERTI' I By b-lA~4.,\-0-~-- -0(~puty 
! Raq1:1.:-sl of 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
County of Bonneville ) 
On the \'&~ day of March 1999, before me the undersigned, a notary public in and 
for said State, personally appeared Linda Wilkins, known or identified to me to be one of the 
partners in the partnership of Canyon Cove Development Company, LLP and the partner or 
one of the partners who subscribed said partnership name to the foregoing instrument, and 
acknowledged to me that she executed the same in said partnership name. 
IN WI1NESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal 
the day and year in this certificate first above written. 
(seal) 
G:\Wl'DATAIGLM\1700\CANCOV.RFR:as 
Notary Public for Idaho 
Residing at Idaho Falls, Idaho 
My Commission Expires: \ \~~ \~t)CJ~ 
I 7 
r· . ·.:~~;1-,,.;~7°;0;c;t· · ·.·- -, 
~ Lf.NORE J. KATF<.I 
~ :STATE OF lDA,-1') • 
~;;,-,,..~~,t,v-,,.:,~ ,~ -d 
A 5!(.11~ at 1cano r .oi.; ,i.lJ"'-> 
Mf Cvmmll>SlOn f..p ir as .;a_. !.?. ;:. ':J..i 




.. ~ -- ., • ... · - BOttl8iILLE CWHTY RECffillER 
ASSIGNMENT AND ASSUMPTION 1090210 SEPc.'7'02 Pt14c.3 
Canyon Cove Development Company, LLP, an Idaho limited liability partnership, 
hereby assigns to Bums Concrete, Inc., an Idaho corporation, all of its rights and obligations 
under the following instruments: 
1. Idaho Fann Lease dated the 18th day of March, 1999, with Canyon Cove 
Development Company, LLP, as landlord, and Theodore E. Mulberry and Nora A. Mulberry, 
husband and wife, and Michael Mulberry and Ina Sue Mulberry, husband and wife, as tenant. 
2. Undivided Right of First Refusal to Acquire Interest in Real Property, with 
Theodore E. Mulberry and Nora A. Mulberry, husband and wife, as sellers, and Canyon 
Cove Development Company, LLP, as buyers. Said Undivided Right of First Refusal to 
Acquire Interest in Real Property pertains to the following described real property: 
Beginning at a point 25 feet West and 1776.28 feet South of the 
Northeast comer of Section 15, in Township 1 North, Range 37 
East of the Boise Meridian, thence continuing South paralleling 
the East line of said Section 15, 888.72 feet, more or less, to the 
Southeast comer of the N.E. 1/4 of said Section 15; thence West 
2895 feet to a point in the East line of the Oregon Short Line 
Railroad right of way, thence Northeasterly along said right of 
way line 1024.6 feet, thence in an Easterly direction 2483.7 feet 
to the place of beginning. ALSO: Beginning at a point 25 feet 
South and 25 feet West of the Northeast comer of Section 15, 
Township 1 North, Range 37 East of the Boise Meridian; thence 
South 1751.28 feet, paralleling Section line between Sections 14 
and 15, thence right angles to said Section line and West 2483.7 
feet to a point in the East line of the Oregon Short Line Railroad 
right of way; thence Northeasterly along said right of way line 
2091 feet; thence East and parallel to North line of Section 15, 
1496 feet to the place of beginning. 
3. Burns Concrete, Inc. hereby assumes all obligations and responsibilities of 
Canyon Cove Development Company, LLP, under the foregoing instruments and hereby 
agrees to indemnify and hold harmless Canyon Cove Development Company, LLP, of any 
liability which may accrue to it as a result of Bums' failure to comply with its obligations 
hereunder. 
Dated this _ _ day ofMarch, 1999. 
33
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STA TE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 





BURNS CONCRETE, INC. 
By: ~~ 
---IZirlcBums, President 
On the Jo 14 day of March, 1999, before me the undersigned, a notary public in and 
for said State, personally appeared Linda Wilkins, known or identified to me to be one of the 
partners in the partnership of Canyon Cove Development Company, LLP, and the partner or 
one of the partners who subscribed said partnership name to the foregoing instrument, and 
acknowledged to me that she executed the same in said partnership name. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereW1to set my hand and affixed my official seal 
the day and year in this certificate first above written. 
(seal) 
2 - ASSIGNMENT AND ASSUMPTION 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
County of Bonneville ) 
On the 3o-r" day of March, 1999, before me, the undersigned, a notary public in and 
for said State, personally appeared Kirk Burns, known or identified to me to be the president 
of the corporation that executed the instrument or the person who executed the instrument 
on behalf of said corporation, and acknowledged to me that such corporation executed the 
same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, 1 have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal, 
the day and year in this certificate first above written. 
-~":lf~-~~.,, ,. ___ ~ /_ h, - /,, 
NOTARY PUBL~M c;r:· ~~
GARY L MEIKLE /tfotary~ for Idaho 
(seal) STATE OF IDAHO esiding at Idaho Falls, Idaho 
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Robert B. Burns, JSB No. 3744 
PARSONS BEHLE & LA TIMER 
800 W. Main Street, Suite 1300 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone; (208) 562-4900 
Facsimile: (208) 562-4901 
Email: rbums@parsonsbehle.com 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 




BURNS CONCRETE, TNC. , and CANYON 
COVE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, LLP, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-16-3413 
ANSWER 
Defendants Burns Concrete, Inc. and Canyon Cove Development Company, LLP Qointly, 
"Defendants") deny each and every averment contained iri the Verified Complaint for Declaratory 
Judgment (the "Complaint''), filed JW1e 29, 2016, by Plaintiffs Nora A. Mulberry and TN Properties 
LLC Uointly, "Plaintiffs"), not expressly admitted below. 
l . Defendants admit the allegations in paragraphs 1·9 of the Complaint. 
2. In response to paragraph 10 of the Complaint, Defendants admit (a) that Plaintiff 
Nora A. Mulberry and her deceased husband executed the Addendum attached as Exhibit 4 to the 
ANSWER-1 
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Complaint (the "Addendum"), which sets forth additional terms and conditions of the property sale 
memorialized in the Commercial/Investment Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement attached as 
Exhibit 3 to the Complaint (the ''PSA"), one of which additional terms and conditions was the 
granting of an option on the terms set forth in the Undivided Right of First Refusal to Acquire 
Interest in Real Property attached as Exhibit 5 to the Complaint (the ''Right of first Refusal"), and 
(b) that all parties to the Addendum and the Right of First Refusal executed each of these documents 
on March 18, 1999, in connection with and on the day prior to the recording of the Warranty Deed 
and other recorded documents that were executed to effect the closing of the real estate transaction 
memorialized in the PSA. Defendants are without knowledge or information sufficient to form a 
belief about the truth of the remaining allegations in paragraph l O of the Complaint. 
3. In response to paragraph 11 of the Complaint, Defendants admit that the Right of 
First Refusal encumbers the real property described as Parcel 1 and Parcel 2 in Exhibit 1 to the 
Complaint (the "Option Property"). 
4. Defendants admit the allegations in paragraph 12 of the Complaint. 
5. In response to paragraph 13 of the Complaint, Defendants admit that Plaintiffs 
contend what they state they contend but deny that there was a failure of consideration with respect 
to the Right of First Refusal and that it is void or voidable for failure of consideration. 
6. In response to paragraph 14 of the Complaint, Defendants admit that Plaintiffs 
contend what they state they contend but deny that the manner and timing by which the Addendum 
and Right of First Refusal were presented was unconscionable and should be set aside. 
7. In response to paragraph 15 of the Complaint, Defendants admit that the Right of 
First Refusal is only enforceable in the context of a sale of the Option Property, but deny that the 
Right of First Refusal is not effective or binding with respect to a sale by any owners of the Option 
ANSWER-2 
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Property who obtain title by inter vivas gift, through a bequest made in a testamentary instrument, or 
by intestate succession. 
8. In response to paragraph 16 of the Complaint, Defendants admit that tbe proposed 
land sale under the PSA was a commercial transaction, but deny that Plaintiffs should be awarded 
any attorney's fees or costs. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
9. Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
l 0. Plaintiffs' claims are barred because the PSA was unenforceable by Plaintiff Nora A 
Mulberry and her deceased husband for multiple independent reasons, including (a) for lack of 
inclusion in the PSA of an adequate legal description, (b) for Mr, and Mrs. Mulberry's fai lure to 
close the subject transaction by the March 4, 1999, closing date specified in Section 12 of the PSA, 
and (c) for the inability of Mr. and Mrs. Mulberry to convey marketable title to the land being sold 
under the PSA in compliance with the requirements specified in Section 16 of the PSA, with 
Defendant Canyon Cove Development Company, LLP ("Canyon Cove") instead having to accept 
title subject to a mortgage for the benefit of Northwest Fann Credit Services, ACA, securing a 
principal indebtedness in the amount of $210,700 (the "Encumbrance"), which remained an 
encumbrance on the land until released ten years after Canyon Cove's acquistion. Thus, Mr. and 
Mrs. Mulberry 's determination to close the subject transaction on the terms set forth in the 
Addendum and the Right of First Refusal was made to induce Canyon Cove to close a transaction 
with respect to which it had no obligation to close. 
11 . Plaintiffs ' claims are barred because the PSA was unenforceable by Canyon Cove for 
lack of inclusion in the PSA of an adequate legal description. Thus, Mr. and Mrs . Mulberry's 
determination to close the subject transaction on the terms set forth in the Addendum and the Right 
of First Refusal was made when they had no obligation to close and forthe purpose of obtaining the 
ANSWER-3 
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additional consideration under the following two provisions in the Addendum from that provided 
under the terms of the PSA: Section 2.A---Canyon Cove's acceptance of the land it pwchased 
subject to the Encumbrance; and Section 5-Canyon Cove's lease of the land it purchased to Mr. 
and Mrs. Mulberry's son and daughter-in-law Michael and Ina Sue Mulberry. 
12. Plaintiffs' claims are be.rred by the doctrines of quasi-estoppel, equitable estoppel 
and/or promissory estoppel. 
13. Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the doctrine of I aches. 
ATTORNEY FEES 
14. Defendants have been reqwred to engage legal counsel to defend against the claims 
made by Plaintiffs, which arise out of a commercial transaction, and Defendants are therefore 
entitled to recover the reasonable attorney fees they incur pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 12-
120(3), 12-120, and 12-123. 
PRAYER 
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray for judgment as follows: 
l. for the Complaint to be dismissed with prejudice and Plaintiffs to take nothing 
thereby; 
2. for an award of Defendants' reasonable attorney fees and costs; and 
3. for such other and further relief as the Court may determine to be just and proper. 
DATED this 22nd day of July 2016. 
ANSWER-4 
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JURY DEMAND 
Defendants demand that all issues that are by right triable to a jury be heard and decided by a 
jury of 12 persons. 
DA TED this 22nd day of July 2016. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 22nd day of July 2016, a true and correct copy of the 
within and foregoing instrument was served upon: 
Donald F. Corey 
Lindsey R. Romankiw 
Carey Perkins LLP 
980 Pier View Drive, Suite B 
P.O. Box 51388 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402-4918 
ANSWER- 6 
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Robert B. Bums, ISB No. 3744 
PARSONS BEHLE & LA TIMER 
800 W. Main Street, Suite l JOO 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone: (208) 562-4900 
Facsimile: (208) 562~4901 
Email: rburns@parsonsbehle.com 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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BURNS CONCRETE, INC., and CANYON 
COYE DEVELOPMENT COMP ANY, LLP, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Bonneville ) 
Case No. CV-16-3413 
AFFIDAVIT OF KIRK BURNS 
I, KIRK BURNS, being duly sworn upon oath, depose and state as follows: 
1. I am and was at all times relevant to the claims pleaded in the above-captioned 
lawsuit the president of Burns Concrete, Inc., one of the two defendants in this lawsuit. 
2. Pursuant to that certain Assignment and Assumption attached as Exhibit 6 to the 
Verified Complaint for Declaratory Judgment filed in this lawsuit, Burns Concrete, Inc. was 
AFFIDAVIT OF KIRK BURNS - 1 
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assigned all of" the interest of the other defendant in this law.~uit, Canyon Cove Development 
. .. . 
Company, LLP, in that certain Undivided Right of First Refusal to Acquire Interest in Real Prope1ty 
(the "ROr'R") attached as Exhibit 5 to the complaint. 
3 . At no time was Burns Concrete, Inc, provlded with written notice by anybody that .it 
might purchase the real property described in the ROFR. 
4. At no time before the current calendar year did Burns Concrete:, Inc. receive written 
notice or otherwise learn that Nora Mulberry and her now deceased husband had conveyed the real 
property described in the ROFR to their entity TN Properties LLC. 
DATED this _!___ day of September 2016. 
AFFIDAVIT OF KIRK BURNS • 2 
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RECEIVE: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the fr~ day of September 2016, a true and correct copy of 
the within and foregoing instrument was served upon: 
Donald F. Carey 
Dina L. Sallak 
Lindsey R. Romankiw 
Carey Perkins LLP 
980 Pier View Drive, Suite B 
P.O. Box51388 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402-4918 
AFFTDA VJT OF KTRK BURNS - 3 
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Robert B. Burns, ISB No. 3 744 
PARSONS BEHLE &LATIMER 
800 W. Main Street, Suite 1300 
Boise, ID 83702 
Telephone: (208) 562-4900 
Facsimile: (208) 562-4901 
Email: rbums@parsonsbehle.com 
Attorneys for Defendants 
21U SEP -8 AH IQ: 46 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 




BURNS CONCRETE, INC., and CANYON 
COVE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, LLP, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Bonneville ) 
Case No, CV-16-3413 
AFFIDA YIT OF LINDA WILKINS 
I, LINDA WILKINS, being duly sworn upon oath, depose and state as follows: 
~ 005/007 
1. I am and was at all times relevant to the claims pleaded in the above-captioned 
lawsuit the managing partner of Canyon Cove Development Company, LLP, one of the two 
defendants in this lawsuit. 
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1.1'\lrsuant to that certain Assignment and Assumption attached as Exhibit 6 to the 
Verified Complaint for Declaratory Judgment filed in this lawsuit, Canyon Cove 
Development Company, LLP assigned all of its interest in tht1t certnin Undivided Right of 
First Refusal to Acquire Interest in Real Property (the "ROFR") attached as Exhibit 5 to 
the complaint to the other defendant ln thls lawsuit, Burns Concrete, Inc. 
3,At no time was C-anyoo Cove Development Company, LLP provided with written 
notice by anybody that it might purchase the real property described in the ROFR. 
4.At no time befote the current calendar year did Canyon Cove Development Company, 
LLJ> receive written notice or otherwise lesrn that Nora Mulberry and her now deceased 
husband had conveyed the 1-e.al property described in the ROFR to their entity TN 
Properties LLC. 
/ .,(\\,. 
DATED this~ day of September 2016/ ' 
. ;_ 
--r , -
": '\ / .If I 
'\._.> _,./µlrJCV L/ ~ ~IV.,/ 
LINDA WILKINS 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this Jg__ day of September 2016, 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 8~ day of September 2016, a true and correct copy of 
REC EIV E: 
the within and foregoing instrument was served upon: 
Dona.Id F. Carey 
Dina L. Sallak. 
Lindsey R. Romankiw 
Carey Perkins LLP 
980 Pier View Drive, Suite B 
P.O. Box 51388 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402-4918 
AFfilDAVIT or LINDA WILKJNS - 3 
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Case No. CV-2016-3413 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER RE: MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
BURNS CONCRETE, INC., and CANYON ) 
COVE DEVELOPMENT COMP ANY, ) 
LLP, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) - - - - -----------
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On January 26, 1999, Theodore E. Mulberry, Nora M. Mulberry, Michael Mulberry and Ina 
Mulberry, sold land to Canyon Cove Development Company (Canyon Cove) under a 
Commercial Investment Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement (PSA). At closing on 
March 18, 1999, the parties executed an addendum to the PSA, clarifying the PSA' s terms. 
A right of first refusal (ROFR) for a parcel of land owned by Theodore and Nora Mulberry, 
separate from that parcel sold to Canyon Cove, was executed at the same time. The ROFR 
provides: 
1. For adequate consideration, Sellers hereby grant to the Buyer a right of first 
refusal to acquire the Sellers' undivided interest in and to the real property 
hereafter described on the same terms, conditions, and provisions as the 
Sellers might intend to sell and convey said interest to any third person 
hereafter. 
2. Should the Sellers hereafter intend to sell in good faith and convey said 
premises they will first offer the same to the Buyer by a written notice 
containing all of the terms, conditions, and provisions by which they intend to 
sell in good faith the same to said third person. Buyer shall then have five (5) 
days from the date such notice is received to accept or refuse said offer. 
Verified Compl. for Declaratory J. , Ex. 5. 
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On or about March 30, 1999, Canyon Cove assigned its interest in the ROFR to Burns 
Concrete, Inc. (Burns). 
Theodore and Nora Mulberry conveyed the land subject to the ROFR to TN Properties, 
LLC, in August 2005. Theodore passed away sometime subsequent to that transfer. Nora is now 
the sole owner of TN Properties. 
Plaintiffs filed a Verified Complaint for Declaratory Judgment on June 29, 2016 and a 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on August 22, 2016. 
Defendants filed a Memorandum In Opposition To Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial 
Summary Judgment on September 8, 2016. 
This Court heard arguments on the motion for summary judgment on September 22, 
2016. At the hearing, the Court agreed to allow additional time for settlement discussions and 
briefing. Following a status conference on October 13, 2016, this Court took the motion for 
summary judgment under advisement. 
II. ST AND ARD OF ADJUDICATION 
A. Motion for Summary Judgment 
A motion for summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, 
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). See Grover v. Smith, 137 Idaho 247, 46 P.3d 1105; Rockefeller v. 
Grabow, 136 Idaho 637, 39 P.3d 577 (2002). The burden is, at all times, on the moving party to 
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 2 1 
P.3d 908 (2001). 
The United States Supreme Court, in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 
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2548 (1986), stated: 
Of course, a party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial 
responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and 
identifying those portions of "the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any," which 
it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. But unlike 
the Court of Appeals, we find no express or implied requirement in Rule 56 that 
the moving party support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials 
negating the opponent's claim. On the contrary, Rule 56(c), which refers to "the 
affidavits, if any" (emphasis added), suggests the absence of such a requirement. 
And if there were any doubt about the meaning of Rule 56( c) in this regard, such 
doubt is clearly removed by Rules 56(a) and (b), which provide the claimants and 
defendants, respectively, may move for summary judgment "with or without 
supporting affidavits" (emphasis added). The import of these subsections is that, 
regardless of whether the moving party accompanies its summary judgment 
motion with affidavits, the motion may, and should, be granted so long as 
whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for the entry of 
summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied. One of the principal 
purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually 
unsupported claims or defenses, and we think it should be interpreted in a way 
that allows it to accomplish this purpose. 
Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2553 (alterations in original). 
When assessing a motion for summary judgment, all controverted facts are to be liberally 
construed in favor of the non-moving party. Dodge-Farrar v. American Cleaning Services, Co., 
137 Idaho 838, 54 P.3d 954 (Ct. App. 2002). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a 
court is not permitted to weigh the evidence to resolve controverted factual issues. Meyers v. 
Lott, 133 Idaho 846,993 P.2d 609 (2000). Liberal construction of the facts in favor of the non-
moving party requires the court to draw all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the non-
moving patty. Farnworth v. Ratliff, 134 Idaho 237, 999 P.2d 892 (2000); Madrid v. Roth, 134 
Idaho 802, 10 P.3d 75 1 (Ct. App. 2000). 
The Idaho appellate courts have fo llowed the United States Supreme Court's decision in 
Celotex, which stated: 
Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural 
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shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are 
designed "to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every 
action." ... Rule 56 must be construed with due regard not only for the rights of 
persons asserting claims and defenses that are adequately based in fact to have 
those claims and defenses tried to a jury, but also for the rights of persons 
opposing such claims and defenses to demonstrate in the manner provided by the 
Rule, prior to trial, that the claims and defenses have no factual basis. 
Id. at 327, 106 S.Ct. at 2555 (citations omitted); see Win of Michigan, Inc. v. Yreka United, Inc., 
137 Idaho 747, 53 P.3d 330 (2002); Thomson v. City of Lewiston, 137 ldaho 473, 50 P.3d 488 
(2002). 
A party against whom a summary judgment is sought cannot merely rest on his pleadings 
but, when faced with affidavits or depositions supporting the motion, must come forward by way 
of affidavit, deposition, admissions or other documentation to establish the existence of material 
issues of fact, which preclude the issuance of summary judgment. Anderson v. Hollingsworth, 
136 Idaho 800, 41 P.3d 228 (2001); Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 16 P.3d 263 (2000). The 
non-moving party's case, however, must be anchored in something more than speculation, and a 
mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue of fact. Wait v. Leavell Cattle, 
Inc. , 136 Idaho 792, 41 P.3d 220 (2001). 
The moving pa1ty is entitled to judgment when the non-moving party fails to make a 
sufficient showing as to the essential elements to which that party will bear the burden of proof 
at trial. Primary Health Network, Inc. v. State, Dept. of Admin. , 137 Idaho 663, 52 P.3d 307 
(2002). Facts in dispute cease to be "material" facts when the plaintiff fails to establish a prima 
facie case. Post Falls Trailer Park v. Frede kind, 131 Idaho 634, 962 P .2d 1018, ( 1998). In such 
a situation, there can be no genuine issue of material fact, since a complete failure of proof 
concerning an essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily renders all other 
facts immaterial. Id. 
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Generally, the trial court is not permitted to weigh the evidence or resolve 
controverted factual issues when ruling on a motion for summary judgment. AID 
Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 119 Idaho 897, 900, 811 P.2d 507, 510 (Ct.App.1 991 ). 
However, where the "evidentiary facts are not disputed and the trial court rather 
than a jury will be the trier of fact, summary judgment is appropriate, despite the 
possibility of conflicting inferences because the court alone will be responsible 
for resolving the conflict between those inferences." Riverside Development Co. 
v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 51 9, 650 P.2d 657, 661 (1982). See also AID Ins. Co. , 
119 Idaho at 900, 811 P.2d at 510 (if the court will be the ultimate finder of fact, 
both parties have moved for summary judgment and the motions are based on the 
same evidentiary facts, then "summary judgment is appropriate even though 
conflicting inferences are possible, so long as all the evidence is confined entirely 
to the record"); Blackmon v. Zufelt, 108 Idaho 469, 470, 700 P.2d 91, 92 
(Ct.App.1985) (when the judge will be the trier of fact, he or she is free to arrive 
at the most probable inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted evidentiary 
facts). 
Small v. State, 132 Idaho 327, 334, 971 P.2d 1151, 1158 (Ct. App. 1998); accord Drew v. 
Sorensen, 133 Idaho 534, 539, 989 P.2d 276, 281 (1999). 
B. Declaratory Judgment 
Idaho Code§ 10-1201 provides: 
Courts of record within their respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare 
rights, status, and other legal relations, whether or not further relief is or could be 
claimed. No action or proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground that a 
declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for. The declaration may be either 
affirmative or negative in form and effect, and such declarations shall have the 
force and effect of a final judgment or decree. 
Idaho Code § 10-1202 provides: 
Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract or other wntmgs 
constituting a contract or any oral ... may have determined any question of 
construction or validity ari sing under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract 
or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations 
thereunder. 
III. DISCUSSION 
Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment that the ROFR "was personal to the parties and is 
not binding on Ted and Nora Mulberry's heirs, successors, devisees, or assigns, nor can it benefit 
Burns Concrete." Mem. in Support of M. for Partial Summ. J. at 4. Plaintiffs argue that the 
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ROFR is unambiguous and that under its plain language it only bound Ted and Nora Mulberry. 
They c ntend that the ROFR's language does not support any interpretation that it would bind 
the Mulbenys' heirs, successors or assigns. Plaintiffs further argue that the ROFR only mentions 
Canyon Cove and that it cannot be interpreted as permitting an assignment to Bums. They ask 
that this Comt declare the ROFR was terminated upon Canyon Cove's assignment of it to Bmns. 
Defendants respond that a right of first refusal is not p rsonal to the parties in Idaho. 
Defendants assert that all non-personal contract rights may be assigned. Citing Sinclair Mkl.g. , 
inc. v. iepert, 107 Idaho 1000 1002 695 P.2d 385, 387 (1985). De£ ndants raise several 
additio al arguments in opposition to Plaintiffs' motion. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' action 
is not ripe for adjudication. Defendants contend that the doctrine of quasi estoppel bars Plaintiffs 
fro benefitting from the Mulben-ys' conveyance of the property to TN Properties. Defendants 
add that the doctrine of laches precludes Plaintiffs from now nullifying their contractual 
obligations under the ROFR. 
A. Ripeness 
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' action is not ripe for adjudication because there is no 
ev1 ence that any sale of the property is currently being contemplated. Defendants cite ABC 
Agra, L LC v. Critical Access Group, Inc., 156 Idaho 781 , 331 P.3d 523 (2014). 
Idaho courts have the power to declare the rights, status and legal relations of 
persons affected by contracts. LC.§§ 10-1201 & 1202. Breach of a contract is not 
required for the issuance of a declaratory judgment regarding a contract dispute. 
LC. § 10- 1203; Utah Power & Light Co. v. Idaho Pub. Utils. Comm 'n, 112 Idaho 
10, 12, 730 P.2d 930, 932 (1986) (noting that Idaho Code section § 10-1203 
"provides for the issuance of a declaratory judgment in a contract dispute 'before 
or after there has been a breach.' ") However, an actual or justiciable controversy 
is still a prerequisite to a declaratory judgment action; thus, courts are precluded 
"from deciding cases which are purely hypothetical or advisory." Bettwieser v. 
N Y Irrigation Dis t. , 154 Idaho 317 326,297 P.3d 1134, 1143 (2013) (quoting 
Wylie v. Jdaho Transp . Bd. , 151 Idaho 26, 31 , 253 P .3d 700, 705 (2011 )) . Idaho 
has adopted the constitutionally based federal justiciability standard. Davidson v. 
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Wright, 143 Idaho 616, 620, 151 P.3d 812, 816 (2006). Ripeness is that part of 
justiciability that "asks whether there is any need for court action at the present 
time." ld. (quoting Gibbons v. Cenarrusa, 140 Idaho 316, 317, 92 P.3d 1063, 
1064 (2002)). "The traditional ripeness doctrine requires a petitioner or plaintiff to 
prove 1) that the case presents definite and concrete issues, 2) that a real and 
substantial controversy exists, and 3) that there is a present need for adjudication." 
Paddison Scenic Props. , Family Trust; L.C. v. Idaho Cnty. , 153 Idaho 1, 4, 278 
P.3d 403 406 (2012) (quoting Noh v. Cenarrusa, 137 Idaho 798, 801 , 53 P.3d 
1217, 1220 (2002)) . 
Id. at 783, 331 P.3d at 525 (note omitted). 
"Generally, in detem1ining whether to grant a declaratory judgment, the criteria is 
whether it will clarify and settle the legal relations at issue, and whether such 
declaration will afford a leave from uncertainty and controversy giving rise to the 
proceeding." Miles, 116 Idaho at 642 778 P.2d at 764 (quoting Sweeney v. 
American Natl. Bank, 62 Idaho 544 115 P.2d 109 (1941)). If deferring the 
adj udicati.on "would add nothing material to the legal issues presented" so that a 
court will be in no better position in the future and if a declaration of the rights of 
patties will "ce1iainly afford a relief from uncertainty and controversy in the 
future" the case may be presently ripe for adjudication. Id. 
Schneider v. Howe , 142 Idaho 767, 773 , 133 P.3d 1232, 1238 (2006) 
In ABC Agra, ABC was the developer of a large scale planned unit development. In 
2007, St. Benedict's hospital executed an option agreement to purchase a lot in the PUD for the 
construction of a new hospital. Under the agreement if St. Benedict's purchased the lot, ABC 
would i:,ift them two neighboring lots for construction of the hospital. The agreement restricted 
the use of the three lots solely for the construction of healthcare facilities. The agreement was 
binding on St. Benedict's successors and assigns. In 2011 , St. Benedict's conveyed its lots to 
Critical Access Group, Inc. (CAG). ABC sent CAG a letter, informing it of the restricted use 
placed on the lots. CAG responded that it was aware of ABC's position that the lots had a 
restricted use covenant and also stating "The fact that CAG is aware of your client's previous 
position should not be interpreted as a statement that CAG agrees with such positions." AB 
Agra, 156 Idaho at 782 331 P.3d at 524. ABC then filed a complaint for declaratory relief 
seeking a declaration that only a healthcare facility could be constructed on the three lots. The 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: MOTION FOR PARTIAL SU MMARY JUDG T - 7 
54
district court held that the claim was not ripe because the controversy involved "uncertain or 
contin ent future events that may not occur as anticipated or indeed may not occur at all." id. 
The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court. 
ABC argued that there was a present need for adjudication because the uncertainty 
regarding the lots' restricted use harmed its ability to market the remainder of the PUD. CAG 
responded that because there were no facts that would indicate that it planned to build anything 
other than a healthcare faci lity there was no real and substantial controversy. In affirming the 
district court, the Supreme Court held: 
In order for there to be a justiciable controversy there must be more than a 
difference or dispute of a hypothetical or abstract character. Davidson, 143 Idaho 
at 620, 151 P.3d at 816. Accordingly, "a litigant seeking a declaratory judgment 
must demonstrate that an actual controversy exists and that the requested relief 
wi11 provide actual relief not merely potential relief." 
id. at 784, 331 P.3d at 526. "[A] remote contingency is not sufficient to satisfy the requirements 
for a justiciable controversy." Wylie v. Idaho Transp. Bd., 151 Idaho 26, 34,253 P.3d 700 708 
(2011). The Com1 in ABC noted that the facts in that case were distinguishable from those in the 
9th Circuit case of Principal L(fe Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 394 F.3d 665, 671 (9th Cir.2005), where a 
disagreement arose between the parties to a long-term lease. One of the pa11ies was unable to 
sell its interest because of the disagreement. The 9th Circuit held the case was ripe for 
adjudi ation. The ABC Court noted that in Robinson there "was no question as to the presence of 
a disputed term in the contract." Id. at 785, 331 P.3d at 527. The Court then distinguished 
Robinson by indicating that AB lacked a clear contractual dispute similar to that which existed 
in Robinson: 
[A] clear dispute existed in Robinson. It was not merely an allegation that the 
parties likely would not agree on the meaning of the renegotiation term in the 
lease if the leasehold interest was ever sold, but that the parties presently did not 
agree on its meaning, had memorialized the disagreement, and the disagreement 
had actually prevented the sal of th leasehold. No similar fac ts exist here. ABC 
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simply alleges that CAO likely disagrees with its interpretation of the restrictive 
covenant and this disagreement may affect its ability to market ABC's other 
properties. 
Id. (emphasis added) 
In Schneider, a case which involved a disagreement between the parties regarding 
whether an easement existed, the Idaho Supreme Court held the case was ripe for adjudication, 
explaining: 
Delaying the adjudication would add nothing material to the litigation and a com1 
would be in no better position to decide the existence of the easement. A 
declaration regarding the existence of an easement will afford both Schneider and 
the Howes relief from uncertainty and controversy in the future. 
Schneider v. Howe, 142 Idaho at 773, 133 P.3d at 1238. Similarly, in Miles v. Idaho Power 
Company, 116 Idaho 635, 778 P.2d 757 (1989), the Idaho Supreme Court held: 
Here, nothing can be gained by delaying adjudication of the issue. It is clear that 
this issue will be before us either now or in the future, and a declaration now of 
the various rights of the parties will certainly afford a relief from uncertainty and 
controversy in the future. "Since we are persuaded that 'we will be in no better 
position than we are now' to decide this question, we hold that it is presently ripe 
for adjudication." Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Env. Study Group, 438 U.S. at 82, 
98 S.Ct. at 2635. 
The facts in this case are more similar to those in Robinson than in ABC Like in 
Robinson, the parties in this case plainly disagree regarding the terms of their contractual 
agreement. There is no question that the parties dispute whether the ROFR is binding on 
subsequent owners who obtained title by inter vivos gift, bequest, or intestate succession. 
Delaying adjudication in this case would not add anything material to the litigation. Neither can 
this Court perceive that it would be in any better position to decide the question of the ROFR's 
assignability at a future date. Rather, declaring whether the ROFR is assignable will afford both 
Mulbe1Ty and Defendants relief from uncertainty and controversy in the future. Consequently, 
the issue is presently ripe for adjudication. 
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B. ight to Assign the ROFR 
1. Effect of Canyon Cove's Assignment of the ROFR to Burns 
"Generally, all contract rights which are not 'personal' in nature may be assigned." 
Sinclair Mktg., Inc. v. Siepert 107 Idaho 1000, 1002, 695 P.2d 385,387 (1985), quoting 
WrLLISTO ON CONTRACTS (3d ed.)§ 412 . Whether a right of first refusal is personal in nature 
appears to be a case of first impre sion in Idaho. Rights of first refusal are generally considered 
personal, however: 
Option contracts, as a general rule, are assignable. Rights of first refu al are 
presumed to be personal, and are thus not assignable unless either the clause 
granting the right refers to successors or assigns or the instrument clearly sho-ws 
that the right was intended to be assignable. A right of first refusal to purchase 
real property is not assignable if the right does not run with the land but is 
personal to the grantee . 
6A C.J .S. Assignments§ 36 (emphasis added; notes omitted). 
The right of first refusal may be considered a personal contract, and as such, when 
a right of first refusal is conveyed simultaneou ly with a parcel the sub equenL 
assignment and exercise of the right of first refusal may be void as the right of 
first refusal does not rW1 with the land but rather i · personal to the granLee, and 
thus is extinguished when the property is conveyed. 
6 Am . Jur. 2d Assignments § 40 ( mphasis added). 
Contracts that involve personal services, a special confidence, or the like, so as to 
make them nonassignable, include-
- the right of first refusal unles the particular clause granting the right 
refers to successors or assigns or the instrument otherwise shows that the right 
was intended to be transferable or assignable. 
6 . Jur. 2d Assignments § 28. 
When int rpreting a written contract this Court "begins with the language of the 
contract itself." Cristo Viene Pentecostal Church v. Paz, 144 Idaho 304, 308, 160 
P.3d 743 747 (2007) (quoting Independence Lead Mines Co. v. Hecla }.;fining 
Co., 143 Idaho 22 26, 137 P.3d 409 413 (2006)) . If a contract's language is 
unambiguou "then its meaning and legal effect must be d t rmined from its 
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words." Id. (citing Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, LLC, 140 Idaho 354, 361, 93 
P.3d 685, 692 (2004)). An ambiguous contract is one that is "reasonably ubject 
to conflicting interpretations." Id. (quoting Lamprecht 1 . Jordan, LLC 139 Idaho 
I 82, 185, 75 P.3d 743, 746 (2003)). "Detennining whether a contract is 
ambiguous is a question of law over which this Comt exercises free revi.ew." Id. 
Boi e Mode, LLC v. Donahoe Pa e & Partners Ltd., 154 Idaho 99, 108 294 P.3d 11 11 1 l 20 
(2013) 
The language of the ROFR in this case is plain a11d unambiguous. It does not make any 
refer nee to successors or assigns or give any indication that the ROFR was intended to be 
anythi g other than personal to the grantee. Consequently, the ROFR is presumed to be 
per on I and non-assignable. Canyon ove's assignment of the ROFR and conveyance of its 
inter st under the March 18, l 999 lease agreement extinguished the ROFR. 
Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment seeking a declaratory judgment that the ROFR 
was p sonal to the parties and cannot benefit Bums Concrete should be granted. The ROFR 
was extinguished when Canyon Cove conveyed its interest in the properties to Burns. 
2. Effect of the Mulberrys' Conveyance to TN Properties 
Although a right of first refusal may be personal to the grantee. It is not personal to the 
grantor. "A transfer of property by gift from one family member to another does not trigger a 
right of first refusal." 92 C.J.S. Vendor and Pw-chaser § 180. 
In Isaacson v. First Sec. Bank of Utah, 95 Idaho 452, 511 P.2d 269 (1973), the Idaho 
Supreme Court examined the impact of a gift of prope11y subject to a right of first refusal. In that 
cas , th defendant bank, as trustee for Thomas W. Richards, leased the subject property to 
Stanley a11d Twila Isaacson. The lease included a right of first refusal, as follows: 
In (the) event (lessor) des ires to sell property included in this lease (lessees) 
agree to yield a11d deliver up the said premises to (lessor), provided, howe er that 
(lessees are) granted first right of refusal to purchase premises. It is understood 
that (lessees are) entitled to any crops that are in the process of growing at time of 
ale should one occur.' 
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id. at 452, 51 l P.2d at 270. 
Prior to the lease's tennination Thomas Richards sold the subject property to his on 
Melvin Richards for $20,000. The lessee brought suit against Melvin for specific performance 
of their right of first refusal. The trial cou11 determined that because the property was valued at 
$60,000 to $70 000, the transfer of property to Melvin was more in the nature of a gift and not a 
sale as contemplated by the lease agreement. 
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed: 
As in these cases, the transfer consummated here was not an open market sale 
resultant from 'arms' length' dealing; rather, the evidence indicates the 
occurrence of a transfer from father to son of property worth at least three times 
the amount of monetary consjderation paid by the transferee ... 
If the father had confe1Ted an outright gift upon the son-i. e., had transferred the 
property in question to him for no consideration whatsoever-it could not be 
successfully contended that the appellants' right of first refusal would thereby 
have been triggered. Where the lessor has indicated his desire to give and not to 
sell the prope1ty ubject to the right of first refusal it cannot be said that the 
condition precedent to the ripening of the right of first refusal has been fulfilled. 
While the transaction at issue partook of the form of a sale, we have no doubt that 
the trial court was correct in concluding that the transfer was more of a gift than a 
sale. The district court correctly went behind the formal sales agreement and 
detem1ined the actual nature of the transaction, which cannot properly be 
characterized as a 'sale' within the meaning of the contract entered into by the 
parties in this case. 
It is undeniable that by the transaction between the father's trustee and the son, 
the property was effectively transferred to a new owner but this does not mean 
that the property was 'placed beyond the lessees' reach,' as they submit. Had the 
donee desired to consummate a bona fide arm 's length sale prior to [the end of 
his lease], he could not have done so without first offering the property to the 
lessees on the same terms he would have been willing to ell to anyone else. See 
Damiano v. Finney, 93 Idaho 482, 464 P.2d 522 (1970). Until the lease was 
terminated, the donee landlord's right to sell the property was subject to the 
lessee 's right of first refusal contained in the lease agreement. Korehnke v. 
Zimmerman, supra; traley v. Osborne, 262 Md. 514, 278 A.2d 64 ( 1971 ); Sand 
v. London & Co., upra. Therefore, the property was within the lessees ' reach to 
the same extent that it alway had been-but their right to purchase would ripen 
only in the event the lessor desired to sell during the term of the leasehold. We 
note, moreover that the effect upon the lessees-i. e. a change in landlords-rt ould 
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have been the same if an unequivocal gift of the reversionary interest had taken 
place. 
Id al 454-55, 511 P.2d at 271-72 (emphasis added; notes omitted). 
The ROFR in this case is triggered if "the Sellers hereafter intend to sell in good faith." 
Verified Comp!. For Declaratory J., Ex. 5. The conveyance of property from the Mulberrys to 
TN Properties was not a sale. Therefore, it did not trigger the ROFR. If the ROFR was still 
valid at the time the property was conveyed to TN Properties, TN Properties, as donee, would be 
held subject to the ROFR in the same way that the Mulberrys were. However, Canyon Cove 
assigned the lease agreement and ROFR to Burns prior to the Mulberrys' conveyance. 
Therefore, the ROFR did not survive to bind TN Properties. 
Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment seeking a declaratory judgment that the ROFR 
was not binding on Ted and Nora Mulberry's heirs , successors, devisees, or assigns should be 
granted though not for the reason argued by Plaintiffs. 
C. Quasi-Estoppel 
Defendants argue that Nora and Theodore Mulberrys' conveyance of the property subject 
to the ROFR to a company now wholly owned by Nora constituted a breach of the covenant of 
food fa ith and fair dealing because it nullified or significantly impaired any benefit of the ROFR. 
Defendants argue that the doctrine of quasi-estoppel bars Mulberry from benefiting from her 
conduct. 
As discussed above, the Mulberrys' conveyance of the property to TN Properties did not 
nullify or impair the ROFR. If Canyon Cove was stil l in possession of its rights under the 
ROFR, despite its attempted assignment of the ROFR to Bums, TN Prope1ties was still subject to 
the terms of the ROFR. Consequently, Defendants' arguments pertaining to quasi-estoppel are 
moot. 
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D. Laches 
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs are barred under the doctrine of laches from benefiting 
from their nullification of the ROFR by conveying the property to TN Properties. 
Because the Mulberry's conveyance of the subject property to TN Properties did not 
nullify the ROFR, Defendants' argument pertaining to laches is moot. 
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment seeking a declaratory judgment that the ROFR 
was personal to the parties and cannot benefit Bums Concrete is granted. The ROFR was 
extinguished when Canyon Cove assigned the ROFR and conveyed its interest in the 
neighboring property to Burns. 
Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment seeking a declaratory judgment that the ROFR 
was not binding on Ted and Nora Mulberry's heirs, successors, devisees, or assigns is granted. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATEDthis L dayof f\ov 2016. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this \ 0 day of N 0\/ OJ\ \Dif 2016, I did send a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the 
correct postage thereon; by causing the same to be placed in the respective courthouse mailbox; 
or by causing the same to be hand-delivered. 
Dina L. Sallak 
CAREY P ERKINS, LLP 
P.O. Box 51388 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Robert B. Burns 
PARSONS BEHLE & LA TIMER 
800 W. Main Street, Suite 1300 
Boise, ID 83702 
PENNY MANNING 
Clerk of the District Court 
Bonneville County, Idaho 
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Robert B. Burns, ISB No. 3744 
PARSONS BEHLE&LATIMER 
800 W. Main Street, Suite 1300 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Telephone: (208) 562-4900 
Facsimile: (208) 562-4901 
Email : rbums@parsonsbehle.com 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
NORA A. MULBERRY and TN PROPERTIES 
LLC, 
Plaintiffs, 
Case No. CV-16-3413 
~ VVL/V I! 
SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF KIRK BURNS 
V. 
BURNS CONCRETE, INC., and CANYON 
COVE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, LLP, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss, 
County of Bonneville ) 
I, KIRK BURNS, being duly sworn upon oath, depose and state as follows: 
1. I am and was at all times relevant to the claims pleaded in the above-captioned action 
the president of Bums Concrete, Inc, ("Burns Concrete' '), one of the two defendants in this lawsuit. 
2. By the Warranty Deed attached hereto as Exhibit A Bums Concrete acquired from 
the other defendant in this lawsuit, Canyon Cove Development Company, LLP ("Canyon Cove"), 
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that certain real property (the "Purchased Property") previously owned by Nora A. Mulberry and her 
husband Theodore E. Mulberry Gointly, the "Mulberrys") referred to in paragraphs 9-10 and 
described in Exhibit 2 of the plaintiffs' Verified Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, filed June 29, 
2016 (the ''Complaint"). 
3. By the Assignment and Assumption attached hereto as Exhibit B Bums Concrete 
also acquired from Canyon Cove all of its interest in that certain Undivided Right of First Refusal to 
Acquire Interest in Real Property (the "ROFR") referred lo in paragraphs 10-11 and appended as 
Exhibit 5 to the Complaint, which encumbered that certain real property (the "ROFR Property") 
previously owned by the Mulberrys, together with the landlord's interest in the farm lease of the 
Purchased Property to the Mulberrys. 
4. As a result of Burns Concrete's ownership of the Purchased Property and its interest 
under the ROFR to acquire the ROFR Property, 1 am very familiar with the location, condition, and 
current and prospective uses of both the Purchased Property and ROFR Property. 
5. The Purchased Property is located between and adjacent to two additional parcels 
( one 5 0 acres and the other 3 5 acres) owned by Burns Concrete, with all of the Purchased Property 
being on the north side of 81 st South (Cotton Road) in Bonneville County and with four residential 
properties constructed along 81 st South lying between it and the Purchased Property. 
6. The ROFR Property is located ac.ross the road from Burns Concrete's 50~acre parcel 
on the south side of 81st South and to the west of the Purchased Property. Thus, not only is the 
ROFR Property not in any manner adjacent or physically "connected" to (nor directly across the road 
from) the Purchased Property, but the two properties share no common irrigation system or other 
utilities, have no common means of ingress or egress, and are subject to no common easements or 
restrictions by which one of the properties benefits the other. For these reasons, there is no 
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requirement for or benefit in the consistent use of the two properties, whether for fanning, residential 
development, mining of aggregate materials, or otherwise. 
7. for the_ forego ing reasons, neither the value nor the use of the Purchased Property (or, 
for that matter, any of Bums Concrete's additional acreage) would in any manner be enhanced by 
Burns Concrete's ownership of the ROFR Property, nor would the Purchased Property otherwise be 
benefitted by common ownership ofit and the ROFR Property. 
DATED this_2_ day of February 2017 . 
By~ 
~BURNS 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this~ day of February, 2017. 
Residing at ~ci..:.:.~UJ.i:::.....::=~e"'d~-----
My Commission Expires: ---1...!,!..,l..lJ'I...J....Ji:,A,o==----
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
THEREBY CERTIFY that on the/~ day ofFebrua1)' 201 7, a true and correct copy of 
the within and foregoing instrument was served upon: 
Donald F. Carey 
Dina L. Sallak 
Lindsey R. Romankiw 
Carey Perkins LLP 
980 Pier View Drive, Suite B 
P. 0 . Box 5 I 3 8 8 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402-4918 
0 U.S. Mail 
~ Facsimile 
0 Hand Delivery 
D Overnight Delivery 
D Email: 
r ell---
Robert B. Bw6s 
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This instr.ument i s rerecorded to include the legal aescription. 
TI-TTS INDENTURE is made this 3o·i\ day of March, 1999, by Canyon Cove 
Development Company, LLPJ the Grantor, and Bums Concrete, Inc., the C'rrantee, whose 
mailing address is P. 0 . Box 1864, Idaho Falls, Idaho) 83403 , 
WITNESSETH, that the Gnmtor, for and· in consideration of the sum of TEN 
-....____ DOLLARS ($10.00) lawful money of the United States of America, and other good and 
valuable consideration, to the Granter in hand paid by the Grantee, the receipt whereof is 
hereby acknowledged, has grankd, bargained, sold, and by these presents does grantJ 
bargain, sell, convey and confirm unto the Grantee, and to the Grantee's heirs and assigns 
forever, aU of the following described property in the County of Bonneville, State ofldaho, 
to"wit: 
See attached Exhibit "A}' 
SUBJECT to: 
A. Mortgage given by Theodore E. Mulbe1Ty and Nora A . Mulberry, 
husband and wife, and Michael Mulberry and Ina Sue Mulberry, husband and wife, 
to Northwest Farm Credit Services, recorded as Instrnment No. 910014, records of 
Bonneville County, Idaho. 
B. Mortgage given by the Grantor to Theodore E. Mulberry and Nora A. 
Mulberry, husband and wife, and Michael Mulbe11y and Ina Sue Mulberry, recorded 
as Instrument No. 991906, records of Bonneville County, Idaho. 
C. All existing easements or claims of easements, patent resenrations, 
rights of way, protective covenants, zoning ordinances, and applicable building codes, 
laws and regulations i encroachments, overlaps, boundary line disputes and other 
matters which would be disclosed by an accurate survey or ins_pection of the premises. 
TOGETHER with all water rights, fixtures, topsoils, gravel, mineral rights, sands, 
tenements, hered itaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in anywise appertaining, 
and any reversions, any remainders, rentsi issues and profits therefrom; and all estate, right, 
title and interest in and to the property, as well in law as in equity, of the Grantor. 
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TO HA VE AND TO HOLD the premises and the appurtenances unto the Grantee, and 
to the Grantee's heirs and assigns forever. The Grantor and the Grantor's heirs shall warrant 
and defend the premises in the quiet and peaceable possession of the Grantee and the 
Grantee's heirs and assigns, against the Grantor and the Grantor's heirs, and against every 
person whomsoever who lawfully holds ( or who later lawfully claims to have held) rights in 
the premises as of the date hereof. 
In construing this Warranty Deed and where the context so requires, the singular 
include_s the plural . 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Granter has executed the within instrument the cl3y 
and year first ab ove written. 
I '. i•)SH-1UM!:: l•fr l'JO . ~-=-..:==-➔,t<-,'1<;,..:e..,J 




STAT!: OF f~)M ) 
L';OUNTY OE .O'.'ltlEV:LLE) oo 
I h~r osr:if',' t~r.11 liw 'rltlhiri 
t ,·.,~s n~c,,rd,id. 
CANYON COVE DEVELOP:tv1ENT 
COMPANY, ~ 
By: . 
On the 3oh. day of March, 1999, before me the undersigned, a. notary public in a1~d 
for said State, personally appeared Linda Wilkins, known or identified to me to be one of the 
partners in the partnership of Canyon Cove Development Company, LL&, and the partner 
or one of the partners who subscribed said partnership name to the foregoing instrument, and 
acknowledged to me that she executed the same in said partnership name. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, T have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official seal 
the day and year in this ce1tificate first above written. 
Notai.y blic for Idaho 
Resi ng at Idaho Falls, Idaho 
My Commission Expires: ,2: It 112-a0 J 
' 
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Set:tlon 11: Wl/2 Eln SWl/4, nncJ · 
Tbe East !155 feet of the Wc.:,t Half or the Southwest Qullrtcr. 
EXCEPTING THEREFROM ALL OF THE liOLLOWJNG DESCRIBED PROPERTIES: 
a. Begiuniqg Bf the Southwest Corner or Section il, Townshi('I l North, Rnnge .3 7 Eul or the Boise 
Meridi11n, Donneville Counry, 111:lho; nmJ running ,N89°48'E 501.45 rect nlong the Soulh side or 
Sct'.tion 11 to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING; thonce N89°48'E 190.80 feel nlong uld Scee.ion 
llbc; 1heacc North 362.40 feet; thence N79"JD'W l6S.LD feet; thence N88°00'W. 128.55 rect; lluuu:c 
South 397,99 rl!ol to lhc ('IOlnl or beginning. 
b, Deginai11g nt tin, Southwest Comer of Siecllon U, Townsblp l North, Range J7 East or the Ool:11! 
Merldiu, Ilo"nevllle County, ldn.ho; ,uuJ tunning th0nt1: N851'•cf8'E 185,42 fee, 11clong the South side 
of u1id Section l l to the TRUE POINT OF DECINNING; thenca N89°48 1E 316.00 re-et 11long 911ld 
Sect1 CID line; theDCI!! Notth Jn.99 feer; thence NIil "28'20"W 319.74 feet; tl1cnce S0°07'40"E 440.96 
f~t lo lhc true point or beginning. 
c. Deglnoing at lhc Southwet Corner or Section l I, Township J North, H.u.ngc J7 En3t or lho Uolse 
Mllridlao, Ilonnevllle County, Ida ho\ 11nd running N89"48'E 185,4l feet alot1(l the Soutl, ail.la of 5nld 
Se-ctioo 11 lo lhe TRUE POINT OF DE GINNING; which (111int 1'9 o.lso the Southm:!!I Comer or lh11t 
parcel or re.11.lty ducribe.d by t1111c certain W11rranry cJ~ unt!!d M11y 9, 1983, recorded May 11, 1983 
1u Iwtrument No. 64(822 or the publl, re1:ords of s:1ld Ilonpeville County, Idaho; thtnte 
N0°07'40"W 440,98 feet to the Northwcal Corner of s:iid renltyl thence West 20 feet,. more or le9.'1, 
to (he Wetem boundary o( chat parcel of rcnlty clc,1:ribed by Chnt ci:r1ain Wnrmoty ucetl dateu 
Detember 21, 1989, rccordetl Che smme tlale 113 lastrument No. 778822 or lhe p11bllc tttords or ll'3h.l 
Donoevllle County, Idnho; thence S0° l 7'08;,W olong 111icJ Western boundary44l foet, more or less., 
to the Southwu:t Comer or said pared or realty; thence NB9°48 1E nlcmg Che S oulhcrn boundliry or 
said p:u,:cl of l"e,glty 2D.S rce,, 1nore or lcu, 10 the tM.10 point of beglaniqg, 
d. Beglnolag at n rolut that ls 599•43•0011 W 911.66 feet along 1h11 Sectlo.n lino from the Sou lb Quarter 
Cora.er of SectJoo 11, Townshir I North, Ihnge 37 ,:i:O.'lt o( rhe Boin Ba.1ellne ud Meridian, 
Bonneville Cou11ty1 l1.haho, running !hence Noo•12•00 11W 239.50 feet; thence N89"49'39"W llJl,44 
reet; thence soo•12•0·011 E 240.GS fret to rhe Sei:tion line; thence N89'48'0U"E 181.44 foci to the polnl 
of begi11n lng. ' 
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ASSIGNMENT AND ASSUMPTION 1090210 SEP,7'02 Pl! 4 23 
Canyon Cove Development Company, LJ..P, an Idaho limited liability partnership, 
hereby ass igns to Burns Concrete, Inc., an Idaho corporation, all ofits righLs and obligations 
under the following instrument<,: 
1. Idaho Farm Lease dated the 18th day of March, 1999, with Canyon Cove 
Development Company, LLP, as landlord, and 1l1codore E. Mulberry and Nora A. Mulberry, 
husband and wife, and Michael Mulberry and Ina Sue Mulberry, husband and wife, as tenant. 
2. Undivided Rjght of First Refusal to Acquire Interest in Real Property, with 
Theodore E. Mulberry and Nora A Mulberry, husband and wife, a.9 sellers, and Canyon 
Cove Development Company, LLP, as buyers. Said Undivided Right of FLrst Refusal to 
Acquire Interest in ReaJ Property pertains to the following described real property: 
Beginning at a point 25 feet \"Vest and 1776.28 feet South of the 
Northeast comer of Section 15, in Township l North, Range 37 
East of the Boise Meridian, thence continuing South paralleling 
the East line of said Section 15, 888.72 feet, more or Jess, to the 
South1::ast corner of the N.E. 1/4 of said Section 15; thence West 
2895 feet to a point in the East line of the Oregon Short Line 
Rajlroad right of way, thence Northeaslerly along said right of 
way line 1024.6 feet, thence in an Easterly direction 2483.7 feet 
to the place of beginning. ALSO: Beginning at a point 25 feet 
South and 25 feet West of the Northeast comer of Section 15, 
Township I North, Range 37 East of the Boise Meridian; thence 
South 175 I .28 feet, paralleling Section line between Sectjons 14 
and 15, thence right angles to said Section line and West 2483 .7 
feet to a point in the East line of the Oregon Short Line Railroad 
right of way; thence Northeasterly along said right of way line 
2091 feet ; thence East and parallel to North line of S ecfion 15, 
1496 feet to the place of beginning. 
J, Burns Concrete, Inc. hereby assumes llll obligations and responsibilities of 
Canyon Co'Ve Development Company, LLP, under the foregoing instruments and hereby 
agrees to indemrufy and hold harmless Canyon Cove Development Company, LLP, of any 
liability which may accrue to it as a result of Bums' failure to comply with its obligations 
hereunder. 
Dated this __ . day ofMarch, 1999. 
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.. • • 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
County of Bonneville ) 
On the~ day of March, 1999, before me, the under..igned, a notary public in and 
for said State, personally appeared Kirk Bums, known or identified to roe to be the p,:esidcnt 
of the corporation that executed the instrument or the person who executed the instrument 
on behalf of said corporation, and acknowledged ro me that such corporation executed the 
same. 
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STATE Of! LOAHO ) 
COIJl'iTY OF lil0t.1t;F.VIU..:) 811 
I i1 .. 1M·,: ..:~1Jt't 11':.il ~'.M ..wuir'l 
,r,r11 r:1m ... ,, •.~·;.,,; r-.:;,;,r,-..1. 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
County of Bonneville ) 
• 
CANYON COVE DEVELOPMENT 
COMPA~ 
By ~~IA tl/4£,~ 'ifn~ ilkins, Managing Partner 
BURNS CONCRETE, INC. 
By: ~ _,,,, 
-KirkBums, President 
lc!.:J V I I / V I I 
On the~ day of March, 1999, before me the undersigned, a notary public in and 
for said State, personally appeared Lin& Wilkins, known or identified to me to be one of the 
pnrmeni in the·partnership of Canyon Covt Development Company, LLP, and the partner or 
one of the partners who subscribed said partnership name to the foregoing instrument, and 
aclmowledged to me that she executed the same in said partnership name. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official ·seal 
the day and year in this certificate first above written. 
2 - ASSIGNMENT AND ASSU1v1PTION 
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IDAHO FALLS, IDAHO 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOmtt~~ l"M a.: I~ 











Case No. CV-2016-3413 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER RE: MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
BURNS CONCRETE, INC., and CANYON ) 





I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On January 26, 1999, Theodore E. Mulberry, ora M. Mulberry, Michael Mulberry and 
Ina Mulberry, sold land (the "Purchased Property") to Canyon Cove Development Company 
("Canyon Cove") under a Commercial Investment Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement 
("PSA"). At closing on March 18, 1999, the parties executed an addendum to the PSA, 
clarifying the PSA 's terms. A right of first refusal (ROFR) for a parcel of land (the "ROFR 
Property") owned by Theodore and ora Mulberry, separate from that parcel sold to Canyon 
Cove, was executed at the same time. The ROFR provides: 
1. For adequate consideration, Sellers hereby grant to the Buyer a right of first 
refusal to acquire the Sellers' undivided interest in and to the real property 
hereafter described on the same terms, conditions, and provisions as the 
SelJers might intend to sell and convey said interest to any third person 
hereafter. 
2. Should the Sellers hereafter intend to sell in good faith and convey said 
premises they will first offer the same to the Buyer by a written notice 
containing all of the terms, conditions, and provisions by which they intend to 
sell in good faith the same to said third person. Buyer shall then have five (5) 
days from the date such notice is received to accept or refuse said offer. 
Verified Compl. for Declaratory J. Ex. 5. 
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On or about March 30, 1999, Canyon Cove assigned its interest in both the Purchased 
Property and the ROFR to Burns Concrete, Inc. ("Burns"). 
Theodore and Nora Mulberry conveyed the land subject to the ROFR to TN Prope1ties, 
LLC, in August 2005. Theodore passed away sometime subsequent to that transfer. Nora is now 
the sole owner of TN Properties. 
Plaintiffs filed a Verified Complaint for Declaratory Judgment on June 29, 201 6 and a 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on August 22, 2016. 
Defendants filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment on September 8, 201 6. 
On November 10, 20 16, this Court entered a Memorandum Decision and Order declaring 
that the ROFR was personal to the Mulberrys and Canyon Cove and that the ROFR was 
extinguished when Canyon Cove assigned it to Bums. The Memorandum Decision and Order 
also declared that the ROFR was not binding on Ted and Nora Mulberry's heirs, successors, 
devisees, or assigns. 
Defendants filed a Motion for Reconsideration on December 30, 2016. 
On January 12, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' 
Motion for Reconsideration. 
On February 24, 2017, Defendants fil ed a Reply in Support of Defendants' Motion for 
Reconsideration. 
This Court heard argument on the motion for reconsideration on March 2, 20 17. 
II. ST AND ARD OF ADJUDICATION 
A. Motion for Reconsideration 
Rule l l .2(b)(1 ) states: 
A motion to reconsider any order of the trial court entered before final judgment 
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may be made at any time prior to or within 14 days after the entry of a final 
judgment. A motion to reconsider an order entered after the entry of final 
judgment must be made within 14 days after entry of the order. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has explained: 
The district court has no discretion on whether to entertain a motion for 
reconsideration pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure l l (a)(2)(B). On a 
motion for reconsideration, the court must consider any new admissible evidence 
or authority bearing on the correctness of an interlocutory order. See PHH Mortg. 
Servs. Corp. v. Perreira, 146 Idaho 631, 635, 200 P.3d 1180, 1184 (2009) (citing 
Coeur d'Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat'! Bank of N Idaho, 118 Idaho 812, 823, 
800 P .2d 1026, I 03 7 (1990)). However, a motion for reconsideration need not be 
supported by any new evidence or authority. When deciding the motion for 
reconsideration, the district court must apply the same standard of review that the 
court applied when deciding the original order that is being reconsidered. ln other 
words, if the original order was a matter within the trial court's discretion, then so 
is the decision to grant or deny the motion for reconsideration. If the original 
order was governed by a different standard, then that standard applies to the 
motion for reconsideration. 
Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266,276,281 P.3d 103, I 13 (2012). 
B. Motion for Summary Judgment 
A motion for summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, 
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law." l.R.C.P. 56(c). See Grover v. Smith, 137 Idaho 247, 46 P.3d 1105; Rockefeller v. 
Grabow, 136 Idaho 637, 39 P.3d 577 (2002). The burden is. at all times, on the moving party to 
demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Jordan v. Beeks, 135 Idaho 586, 21 
P.3d 908 (2001). 
The United States Supreme Cow1, in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 
2548 ( 1986), stated : 
Of course, a pa11y seeking summary judgment always bears the initial 
responsibility of informing the district cotu1 of the basis for its motion, and 
identifying those portions of " the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories. and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any," which 
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it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. But unlike 
the Court of Appeals, we find no express or implied requirement in Rule 56 that 
the moving party support its motion with affidavits or other simi lar materials 
negating the opponent's claim. On the contrary, Rule 56(c), which refers to "the 
affidavits, ~( any" (emphasis added), suggests the absence of such a requirement. 
And if there were any doubt about the meaning of Rule 56(c) in this regard, such 
doubt is clearly removed by Rules 56(a) and (b), which provide the claimants and 
defendants, respectively, may move for summary judgment "with or without 
supporting affidavits" (emphasis added). The import of these subsections is that, 
regardless of whether the moving party accompanies its summary judgment 
motion with affidavits, the motion may, and should, be granted so long as 
whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for the entry of 
summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied. One of the principal 
purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually 
unsupported claims or defenses, and we think it should be interpreted in a way 
that allows it to accomplish this purpose. 
Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2553 (alterations in original) . 
When assessing a motion for swnmary judgment, all controverted facts are to be liberally 
construed in favo r of the non-moving party. Dodge-Farrar v. American Cleaning Services, Co., 
137 Idaho 838, 54 P.3d 954 (Ct. App. 2002). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a 
court is not permitted to weigh the evidence to resolve controverted factual issues. Meyers v. 
Lott, 133 Idaho 846, 993 P .2d 609 (2000). Liberal construction of the facts in favor of the non-
moving party requires the court to draw all reasonable factual inferences in favor of the non-
moving party. Farnworth v. Ratliff; 134 Idaho 237,999 P.2d 892 (2000); Madrid v. Roth, 134 
Idaho 802, 10 P.3d 751 (Ct. App. 2000). 
The Idaho appellate courts have followed the United States Supreme Court's decision in 
Celotex, which stated: 
Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural 
shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are 
designed "to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive dete1mination of every 
action." ... Rule 56 must be construed with due regard not only for the rights of 
persons asserting claims and defenses that are adequately based in fact to have 
those claims and defenses tried to a jmy, but also for the rights of persons 
opposing such claims and defenses to demonstrate in the manner provided by the 
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Rule, prior to trial, that the claims and defenses have no factual basis. 
Id. at 327, 106 S.Ct. at 2555 (citations omitted); see Win of Michigan, Inc. v. Yreka United, Inc., 
137 Idaho 747, 53 P.3d 330 (2002); Thomson v. City of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 50 P.3d 488 
(2002). 
A paity against whom a summary judgment is sought caimot merely rest on hi s pleadings 
but, when faced with affidavits or depositions supporting the motion, must come forward by way 
of affidavit, deposition, admissions or other documentation to establish the existence of material 
issues of fact, which preclude the issuance of summary judgment. Anderson v. Hollingsworth, 
136 Idaho 800, 41 P.3d 228 (2001); Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166. 16 P.3d 263 (2000). The 
non-moving party's case, however, must be anchored in something more than speculation, and a 
mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue of fact. Wait v. Leavell Cattle, 
Inc., 136 Idaho 792, 41 P.3d 220 (2001). 
The moving party is entitled to judgment when the non-moving party fails to make a 
suf ficient showing as to the essential elements to which that party will bear the burden of proof 
at trial. Primary Health Neh,vork, Inc. v. Stale, Dept. of Admin., 137 Idaho 663, 52 P.3d 307 
(2002). Facts in dispute cease to be "material" facts when the plaintiff fails to establish a prima 
facie case. Post Falls Trailer Park v. Fredekind, 131 Idaho 634, 962 P.2d 1018, (1998). In such 
a situation, there can be no genuine issue of material fact, since a complete failure of proof 
concerning an essential e lement of the non-moving pai·ty's case necessai·ily renders all other 
facts immaterial. Id. 
Generally. the tria l court is not permitted to weigh the evidence or resolve 
controverted factual issues when ruling on a motion for summary judgment. AID 
Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 119 ldaho 897,900, 811 P.2d 507,510 (Ct.App.1991 ). 
However, where the "evidentiary facts are not disputed and the trial court rather 
thai1 a j ury will be the trier of fact, sunm1ary judgment is appropriate, despite the 
possibility of conflicting inferences because the court a lone will be responsible 
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for resolv ing the confl ict between those inferences." Riverside Development Co. 
v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 5 15,519,650 P.2d 657, 661 (1982). See also AID ins. Co., 
11 9 Idaho at 900, 8 l 1 P.2d at 510 (if the court will be the ultimate finder of fact, 
both parties have moved for summary judgment and the motions are based on the 
same evidentiary facts, then "summary judgment is appropriate even though 
conflicting inferences are possible, so long as all the evidence is confined entirely 
to the record"); Blackmon v. Zufelt, 108 Idaho 469, 470, 700 P.2d 91 , 92 
(Ct.App. I 985) (when the judge wi ll be the trier of fact, he or she is free to arrive 
at the most probable inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted evidentiary 
facts) . 
Small v. State, 132 ldaho 327,334,971 P.2d 1151, 1158 (Ct. App. 1998); accord Drew v. 
Sorensen, 133 Idaho 534, 539, 989 P.2d 276, 28 1 ( 1999). 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. 6 Am. Jur. 2d Assignments § 40 as authority for extinguishment 
Defendants argue that this Court should not have relied on 6 Am. Jur. 2d Assignments § 
40 to conclude that a personal right of first refusal is extinguished when conveyed to another 
party. Defendants note that this section of the American Jurisprudence cites only one case in 
support of extinguishment. Sniezyk v. Stocker, 188 M isc. 2d 582, 729 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup 2001 ). 
r n holding that a personal right of first refusal was extinguished upon its assignment, Sniezyk 
cited only one authority in support of that conclusion-Adler v. Simpson, 203 A.D.2d 69 I. 610 
N.Y.S.2d 35 1 (3rd Dep't 1994). That case, in turn, involved the extinguishment ofa ri ght of first 
refusal upon the grantor's death and not upon assignment of the right. Defendants contend such 
authority is insufficient to find the ROFR in this case was extinguished upon its invalid 
assignment to Burns. 
6 Am. Jur. 2d Assignments§ 40 provides: 
The right of first refusal may be considered a personal contract, and as such, when 
a right of first refusal is conveyed simultaneously with a parcel. the subsequent 
assignment and exercise of the right of first refusal may be void as the right of 
first refusal does not run with the land, but rather is personal to the grantee, and 
thus is extinguished when the property is conveyed.6 
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6 Sniezyk v. Stocker, 188 Misc. 2d 582, 729 N . Y.S.2d 264 (Sup 2001 ). 
(Note omitted). 
In Sniezyk, defendants Stocker and Grover conveyed a parcel of land and a right of first 
refusal on an adjoining parcel of land to Michele Coons, a non-party in the litigation. Coons 
later conveyed the property and right of first refusal to the plaintiffs in the case. Subsequent to 
Coons's conveyance, Stocker agreed to sell the parcel of land subject to the right of first refusal 
to [a ia. Stocker then gave plaintiffs notice of intent to sell. Plaintiffs notified Stocker that they 
desired to purchase the land under the same terms and conditions as Iaia. but Stocker then 
renounced his intent to sell . Plaintiffs brought an action to compel Stocker to sell the property to 
them. On summary judgment, the court held that the right of first refusal was personal to Coons, 
did not run with the land and was extinguished when Coons conveyed the property to plaintiffs. 
In reaching that decision , the court cited only one case, Adler v. v. Simpson, 203 A.D.2d 691,610 
N. Y.S.2d 351 (3 rd Dep' t 1994). In Adler, like in Sniezyk, the comt found that the right of first 
refusal was personal and not binding on successors or assigns. The decision in Adler. however, 
did not hold that the right of first refusal was extinguished upon conveyance of the subject 
prope1ty, but rather upon the grantor's death. 
This Court agrees with Defendants that the authority cited by 6 Am. Jur. 2d Assignments 
§ 40, without more, is insufficient to conclude that a personal ROFR is extinguished upon its 
invalid assignment. 
B. Noeske v. Hiebert 
Defendants argue that a right of first refusal may be assigned with the consent of the 
grantor or once the right o f first refusal ripens into an option. Neither scenario exists in this case. 
As noted by this Comt in its earlier decision, nothing in the language of the ROFR indicates that 
the parties intended it would be assignable. 
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Defendants also argue that there is no authority establishing that an invalid, ineffective or 
vo id assignment extinguishes the underlying rights absent an express contractual or statutory 
authority requiring extinguishment. Defendants argue that the case of Noeske v. Hiebert, 94 
ldaho 143, 483 P.2d 674 (1970), establishes that an inval id assignment does not extinguish the 
underlying right of first refusal. 
In that case, Noeske sold numerous log-pulling machines and barges to Amos under three 
separate contracts. Noeske retained ti tle on all equipment until the contracts were paid in fu ll. 
The contracts also provided that Amos could not assign the property wi thout Noeske 's consent. 
Another party, Hiebert eventually obtained chattel mortgages on some of the equipment. In 
consideration of H iebert' s relinquishment of his rights under the chattel mortgages, Amos 
assigned Hiebett his rights w1der his third contract with Noeske. Noeske never granted his 
consent to the assignment. The Idaho Supreme Court held the assignment was void as between 
Noeske and Hiebert. The Court explained: "The prohibition of an assignment was for the benefit 
of the vendor, Noeske, however, and it in no way affected the validity of the assignment as 
between Am os and Hiebe1t, subject, of course, to Noeske's interest in enforcing the prohibition." 
id. at 148, 483 P.2d at 679. 
Defendants quote this language of the Idaho Supreme Cowt's decision for the proposition 
that an invalid assignment does not extinguish the underlying contractual rights. The Supreme 
Court did not, however, offer any opinion as to the effect of the invalid assignment on Amos's 
rights under his contract with Noeske. Applying the Court's reasoning in Noeske to this case 
indicates that Canyon Cove and Bums may enfo rce their contractual rights against each other 
under the invalid assignment, but that the assignment is invalid as to Plaintiffs. Noeske does not, 
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however, shed any light on Canyon Cove's rights against Plaintiffs as it pertains to the original 
ROFR. 
C. Waiver 
Plaintiffs argue that although the court in Sniezyk did not explain the rationale behind its 
holding that the right of first refusal was extinguished. the doctrine of waiver offers an apparent 
rationale. They cite Tiffany v. City of Paye/le, 12 1 Idaho 396, 403, 825 P.2d 493. 500 (1992). for 
the proposi tion that a voluntary and intentional relinquishment of rights constitutes waiver. 
Pla intiffs contend that Canyon Cove's conveyance of its interest in the ROFR to Burns was 
intentional and meant to relinquish its rights in the ROFR and Canyon Cove has, therefore. 
waived its rights under the ROFR. 
Defendants reply that a party asset1ing waiver must have detrimentall y altered its position 
in reliance on the waiver. Defendants cite Brand S Corp. v. King, 102 Idaho 731, 639 P.2d 429 
(1981) and Stoddard v. Hagadone Corp. , 147 ldaho 186, 207 P.3d 162 (2009), in suppo1t of their 
argument. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have not detrimentally re lied on Canyon Cove's 
al leged waiver. and Plaintiffs cannot. therefore. rely on the doctrine of waiver. 
Because Sniezyk, does not address waiver, this Court does not assume Sniezyk relied on 
the doctrine to reach its decision. However, this Court will consider Plaintiffs' waiver argument 
independent of Sniezyk. 
"Waiver is a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known right or advantage." 
Brand S Corp. v. King. 102 Idaho 731. 734. 639 P.2d 429, 432 ( l 981 ). The Supreme Court has 
further explained: 
" [Waiver] is a voluntaiy act ai1d implies election by a party to dispense with 
something of value or to forego some right or advantage which he might at his 
option have demanded and ins isted upon." Crouch v. Bischoff 78 Idaho 364, 368. 
304 P.2d 646. 649 (1956). "A patty asse1ting waiver must have acted in reliance 
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upon the waiver and a ltered the party's position." Hecla Mining Co. v. Siar-
Morning Mining Co .. 122 Idaho 778, 782, 839 P.2d 1192, 1196 (1992). 
Stoddardv. Hagadone Corp., 147 ldaho 186, 191,207 P.3d 162, 167 (2009). 
As noted by Defendants, there is no evidence before this Court that would indicate 
P lai ntiffs relied on any alleged waiver by Canyon Cove. Consequently, Plaintiffs cannot rely on 
the doctrine of wa iver to establish Canyon Cove's rights under the ROFR were extinguished. 
D. Appurtenant Servitudes 
Plaint iffs argue that the court in Sniezyk may a lso have held the right of ftrst refusal was 
extinguished because the right of first refusal constituted an appurtenant servitude. Plaintiffs 
contend that when a right of first refusal is personal and appu1tenant to another parcel of property 
and the holder of the right transfers its interest in the appurtenant property, the holder of the right 
of fi rst ref·usal loses the abi li ty to enforce it. Plaintiffs cite Restatement (Third) of Property-
Servitudes § 1.5(3) for the proposition that a servitude can be personal and eith~r appurtenant or 
in gross. 
1. The ROFR is a servitude. 
Defendants argue that the ROF R cannot be a servitude because Section 1.1 of the 
Restatement defines a servitude as something that runs with the land. Defendants contend that 
because this Cow-t held the ROFR was held personally by Canyon Cove, it cannot run with the 
land. They contend that the ROFR does not, therefore, fall within the scope of the Restatement. 
Section 1.1 of the Restatement provides: 
(1) A servitude is a lega l device that creates a right or an obligation that 
runs with land or an interest in land. 
(a) Running with land means that the right or obligation passes automatically 
to successive owners or occupiers of the land or the interest in land with 
which the right or obligation runs. 
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Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) § 1. 1 (2000) ( emphasis added). omment d. lo 
ection 1.1 add : "Although both benefit and burden frequently run with land, a ervitude i 
created if either one runs with land." 
Section 1.3 explain : 
(1) A covenant is a servitude if either the benefit or the l urden runs with land. A 
covenant that is a servitude "run with land." 
Restatement (Th ird) of Prope1ty (Servitudes) § 1.3 (2000). Comment a. to Section 1.3 clarifies: 
These terms indicate only that some part of the covenant runs with some interest 
in land. They do not necessarily mean that both burden and benefit nm, nor do 
they mean that the burden or benefit will nm with all e tates in the land or to all 
successors. 
Section 1.5 defines the following tenns: 
( 1) "Appurtenant" means that the rights or obligations of a servitude are tied to 
ownership or occupancy of a particular unit or parcel of land. The right to 
enjoyment of an easement or profit, or to rece.ive the performance of a covenant 
that can be held only by the owner or occupier of a particular unit or parceL is an 
appmtenant benefit. A burden that obligates the owner or occupier of a particular 
unit or parcel in that person's capacity as owner or occupier is an appurtenant 
burden . 
(2) "ln gross" means that the benefit or burden of a ervitude 1s not tied to 
ownership or occupancy of a pa1ticular w1.it or parcel of land. 
(3) "Personal" means that a servitude benefit or burden is not tran ferable and 
does not run with land. Whether appurtenant or in gro ·, a servitude benefit or 
burden may be personal. 
R tatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes)§ 1.5 (2000) (emphasis added). onunent a further 
clarifies: 
Relation between appurtenant running with land, and personal. Only appurtenant 
benefits and burden · run with land. but the terms are not synonymou '. Running 
with land means that the benefit or burden passes automatically to successors; 
appurtenant means that the benefit can be used only in conjunction with 
owner. hip or occupancy of a particular parcel of land, or that only the owner or 
occupier of a particular parcel is liable for failme to perform a servi tude 
obligation. Appurtenant benefits and burden ordinarily nm with land, but they 
ma; be made personal to particular owner or occupiers of the land. 
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(Emphasis added). 
Section 3.3 of the Restatement provides that the rule against perpetuities does not act to 
invalidate servitudes. Comment a., to section 3.3 indicates that rights of first refusal may be 
contemplated as servitudes. lt states: "The rule stated in this section applies to options and rights 
of first refusal with respect to the purchase ofland, as well as to other servitudes, and to powers 
to create serv itudes in the future." Restatement (Third) of Prope11y (Servitudes)§ 3.3 (2000). 
As discussed in this Court's prior decision, the burden placed on Plaintiffs' property runs 
with the land. Just as Mulberrys were obligated by the ROFR's burden, so too would TN 
Properties be obligated to honor the ROFR. assuming for the sake of argument that the ROFR 
had not been ex tinguished. Consequently, Defendants argument that the ROFR caimot be a 
servitude because it does not run with the land is without merit. 
2. The Restatement (Third) of Property-Servitudes constitutes pertinent, 
persuasive authority in this case. 
Defendants argue that none of the Restatement sections re lied on by Plaintiffs have been 
adopted by the ldaho appellate courts and should not, therefore. be applied. Defendants argue 
that it is improper to rely on the Restatement where the issue can be resolved with current Idaho 
law and when the Restatement is inconsistent with Idaho precedent. Defendants state that there 
is no Idaho case law indicating when a right of first refusal is appurtenant or in gross, but asks 
thi s Court to consider Idaho case law pertaining to easement designations and extend that 
precedent, by analogy, to rights of first refusal. 
In Asbwy Park, LLC v. Greenbriar Estate Homeowners' Ass'n. inc., 152 Idaho 338. 345. 
27 1 P.3d 1194, 1201 (20 12). the t1ial court granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiff on 
the basis of ldaho's common law principal of dedication. On appeal. the defendant HOA argued 
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that the trial court should have applied Section 6.1 9 of the Restatement (Third) of Property-
Servitudes, rather than the common law rule of dedication. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed 
the trial court, explaining: 
The Restatement is not law unless it has been adopted by this Court." Estate of 
Skvorak v. Sec. Union Title ins. Co., 140 Idaho 16, 22, 89 P.3d 856, 862 (2004). 
"This Court wi ll not adopt a Restatement provision if it is inconsisten t with Idaho 
precedent, a different formulat ion resolved the issue, or the issue can be resolved 
by current Idaho law." Id. Since the common law doctrine of dedication exists in 
Idaho and provides a means by which to resolve the parties' ownership dispute, 
we hold that the d istrict court was not obligated to apply the Restatement. The 
HOA's dissatisfaction with tbe burdens imposed upon a party asserting common 
law dedication is not a sufficient basis for this Court to adopt a doctrine not 
previous ly recognized in Idaho when existing Idaho law resolves the matter. We 
therefore affirm the district court. 
Id. at 345, 27 1 P.3d at 1201 (note omitted). 
Unlike in Asbury Park, existing Idaho law pertaining to rights of first refusal does not 
conflict with the Restatement. In fact, as noted by Defendants, Idaho law does not give guidance 
on when a right of first refusal is considered appu1tenant or in gross. This Court, therefore, looks 
to the Restatement, case law in other jurisdictions, and Idaho easement law as guidance in 
deciding this matter. 
3. The ROFR is appurtenant to the Purchased Property. 
Plaintiffs argue that the ROFR is appurtenant to the Pmchased Prope1ty. They cite 
Nature Conservancy of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Altnau. 313 Wis.2d 382, 756 N.W.2d 641 (Ct. App. 
Wis. 2008), which rel ied on sections 4.1 and 4.5 of the Restatement, for guidance in determining 
whether a right of first refusal is appurtenant or in gross. 
Defendants reply that Nature Conservancy, is distinguishable from this case because the 
right of first refusal in that case ran wi th the land and was not personal. Defendants urge this 
Coutt to look to Idaho case law pertaining to appurtenant easements. In particular. Defendants 
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cite to Hoch v. Vance 155 Idaho 636. 639-40, 315 P.3d 824 827-28 (2013), fir the propo ition 
that in order for an eas m nt to be appurtenant, it (and a right of first refusal , by analogy) mu t 
directly benefit the owner of the appurt nant property in such a way that the benefit cannot be 
eparated from the owner' rights in the appurtenant property. D fi ndants argu that use of the 
ROFR Propert does not directly benefit the Purchased Property because the properties are not 
contiguous and do not shar an common easement . r st:rictions. ingress or gress. Defendants 
contend that the ROFR cannot, therefore, be appurtenant to the Purchased Prop rty. 
As pr viously discus ed. the ROFR in this case runs with the land and is a servitud 
Therefore Defendants' efforts to distinguish Nature onservancy on the basis that the ROFR is 
not a servitude i without merit. 
Section 4.1(1) of the Restatement states: 
A servitude should b interpreted to give effect to the intention of the 
parti ascertained from the language used in the instrument, or the circumstances 
sunounding creation of the servitude, and to carry out the purpose for which it 
was created. 
Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) § 4. 1 (2000). 
Section 4.5 states: 
(1) Except where application of the rules stated in§ 4.1 .leads to a different result. 
the benefit of a ser itude is: 
(a) appurtenant to an interest in property if it serves a purpos that would 
be more useful to a succe sor to a property interest held by the original 
beneficiar of the servitude at the time the er itude wa created than it would 
b to the original beneficiary after tran fer of that int rest to a successor 
(b) in gross if created i11 a person who held no property that benefited from 
th servitude. or if it serves a purpose that would be more usefi.11 to the 
original beneficiar than it would be to a successor to an interest in propert 
held by the original b neficiary at the tim th ser itud a created· 
(c) personal if not transferable under the rule stated in § 4.6(2). 
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(2) In cases of doubt, a benefit should be construed to be appurtenant rather than 
in gross. 
Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes)§ 4.5 (2000) (emphasis added). 
In Nature Conservancy. the Wisconsin Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether a 
right of first refusal, which was clearly assignable under its terms, was an in gross serv itude and 
could be ass igned to anybody or whether it was an appurtenant servit ude and had to be assigned 
together with one of three propeit ies adjo ining the subject property. The court relied on contract 
interpretation and the Restatement to determine whether the right of first refusal was app urtenant 
or in gross . The court explained: 
[T]he issue in this case is not whether the right may be assigned, but how it may 
be assigned. It is no contradiction to say that the right of first refusal is assignable, 
and a lso to say that it runs with the land. If the right is appuitenant, and bundled 
with the three parcels sold in the 1967 agreement, it may still be assigned; it 
simply must be assigned along with one of the parcels. 
[T]he ultimate goal in construing this agreement, as in construing other contracts, 
is to determine by the words of the contract what the contracting parties intended. 
We . . . conclude that the 1967 agreement contains no clear and unambiguous 
statement that the right of first refusal is either in gross or appu1tenant to the 
transferred parcels. We also note that our research into Wisconsin case law has 
not turned up any particular rules or test to guide us in determining whether an 
ambiguous writing creates an in gross or appurtenant servitude. However, the 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERT Y: SERVITU DES (2000) does 
prov ide a test. Both parties have argued according to the RESTATEM ENT 
(THIRD) approach, and we find the rules it sets forth reasonable and he lpful. We 
therefore adopt them here. 
The overarching principle fo r the interpretation of servitudes is given in § 4.1: "A 
servitude should be interpreted to give effect to the intention of the parties 
ascertai ned from the language used in the instrument, or the circumstances 
surro unding creation of the servitude, and to carry out the purpose for which it 
was created." Id. § 4.1. Section 4.5 contains more specific rules fo r determining 
whether a servitude benefit is appurtenant or in gross ... . 
MEMORAN DUM DECISION AND ORDER RE: MOTION FOR RECONSIDERAT ION - 15 
89
So the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) system is this: we fi rst look to the language of 
the instrument, th circumstances smTounding the creation of the servitude and 
the purpose for which it was created. Of course thjs firs t step roughly comports 
with what Wiscon in courts do with all written agreements . But jf the language 
and surrounding circumstances (and any extrinsic evidence) fail to yield a clear 
answer as to whether a servitude's benefit is in gross or appurtenant, the 
REST A TEME T (THIRD) pro ides a way of resolving the que tion: we ask 
whether the benefit would be of more u e to someone holding the property 
interest held by the original beneficiary of the servitude, or instead of more use 
to that original beneficiary than to someone else holding the original beneficiary's 
property interest. Where this inqui ry does not yield a clear answer we construe 
the benefit as appu11enant. 
Id. at 390-94; 756 N. W.2d at _ (note omitted). 
In Hoch, the Idaho upreme Court explained: 
There are two general types of easements: easements appu1ienant and easements 
in gro s. Hodgins v. Sales. 139 ldal10 225, 230 76 PJd 969. 974 (2003). This 
Court has explained the differ nee between these two t pes of easements as 
follow : 
An easeme11t appurtenant is a right to use a certain parcel, the servient 
estate, for the benefit of another parcel , the dominant estate. sentially, 
an easement appurtenant r es the owner of the dominant e tate in a way 
that cannot be separated from his right in the land. When an appurtenant 
casement i created, it becomes fixed as an appurtenance to the real 
property which is subject to the prescriptive use and may be claimed by a 
successor in interest. In contrast, an ea ement in gross ben fit th holder 
of the easement personally, witllout connection to the ownership or u e of 
a specific parcel of land. Thus, easements in gross do not attach to 
property. In cases of doubt, Idaho corn1s presume the eas ment is 
appurtenant. 
Id. (internal citation omitted). 
At the time Cridlebaugh reserv d an easement over the upper road to the Hoch 
prope1ty, he was U1 owner of the Hoch property. The ea ement gave him acces 
to hi property. Thus, the asement's benefit to ridlebaugh wa direct! 
connected to his ownership or use of what is now the Hoch prope1iy. The district 
court did not err in holding that this easement was an appurtenant ea cment. 
Hoch v. Vance, 155 Idaho 636. 639-40, 3 l 5 P .3d 824, 827-28 (2013). "[I]n cas of doubt, the 
weight of authority holds that the easement should be presumed appurtenant." Joyce Livestock 
Co. v. niled Stwe . 144 ldaho 1, 12-13, 156 P.3d 502, 513-14 2007) (empha is added . 
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ln this case, the creating document is si lent as to whether the ROFR was intended to b 
appurtenant or in gross . Idaho law provid s: 
Where the language of a written agreement is clear and unambiguous, the trial 
court wi ll give effect to the language employed according to its ordinary meaning 
J R. Simplot Cu. , . Chambers, 82 Idaho 104 350 P.2d 21 1 (] 960)~ Durant '-
Snyder, 65 Idaho 678, 15 1 P.2d 776 (1944), d tern1ination of its meaning and 
legal effect being a question of law. Beal v. Mars Lar on Ranch Corp., In c. , 99 
rdaho 662 586 P .2d l3 78 ( 1978); Park, v. ity of Pocatello, 91 Idaho 24 L 419 
P .2d 683 (1966). 
But when the terms of a written ontract are arnbiguou , its interpretation and 
meaning become a question of fact and exh·in ic evidence may be cons id red by 
the trier or fact in an attempt to an-ive at the true intent of the contracting parties . 
Roberis , . Hollandsworth, 582 F.2d 496 (9th Cir. l 978); Bergkamp v. arrico, 
101 Idaho 365 613 P .2d 376 (1980); Puchner 1. Allau, 101 Idaho 37, 607 P.2d 
1091 ( l 980); Werry v. Phillips Petroleum o. , 97 Idaho 130, 540 P .2d 792 
( 1975); Rudeen v. Howell. 76 ldaho 365,283 P.2d 587 ( 1955). 
1n so doing the trier of fact may consider the objective and purpose or the 
particular provi ion and may al o scrutinize the circumstances surrounding 
formation of the contract . Id. 
lnt 'I Eng'g Co. v. Daum Indus., Inc. , .102 Idaho 363,365,630 P.2d 155, 157 (1981). 
Because the ROFR does not clearly indicate wh ther the partie int nded the right to be 
apprntenant to the Purchased Property or in gross the ROFR is ambiguous as to that issue.1 
Consequently, this Court reso1ts to extrinsic evidence to determine the intent of th parties. TI,e 
facts relating to the execution of the ROFR are not in dispute. The RO FR was xecuted 
simultaneously with the March 18 1999, Add ndum to the PSA at the time of closing on the 
Purchased Property. When Canyon Cove conve edit interest in the Purchased Prope1ty to 
Bum , it simultaneously conveyed its interest in the RO •R. Both of these facts , while not 
conclu ive, suppo1t an infi rence that the parties viewed the ROFR as being appurtenant to the 
1 Thi ou11 notes that in its o em ber 10, 2016, Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motion fo r Partial 
Summary Judgment, it held that the language of the RO R wa plain and unambiguou , a pe1ia in ing to the que tion 
of whether the ROFR was assignable. For the reasons discussed in that dec ision, a find ing of ambiguity on the 
question of appurtenance does not disturb this Court's previous determination that the ROFR was unambiguous a to 
the que tion ofas ignability. 
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Pw-chased Property. lt also supports an inference that the ROFR was intended to benefit the 
Purchased Property. See Hoch. supra. ("An easement appurtenant is a right to use a certain 
parcel, the servienl estate, for the benefit of another parcel. the dominant estate."). 
Looking al the Restatement of Property-Servitudes reinforces a finding that the ROFR 
was appurtenant to the Purchased Property. Though the properties are not contiguous. the 
proximity between the Purchased Prope1ty and the ROFR Property, makes the use of the ROFR 
Property arguably more useful to the owner of the Purchased Property than to an independent 
pait y who does not own nearby prope1ty. While there may be room for doubt as to whether 
Canyon Cove or Burns might retain greater use of the ROFR Property after Canyon Cove's 
conveyance of the Purchased Property to Burns, such doubt is reso lved in favor o f construing the 
ROFR as being appwtenant. See Rest. (Third) of Prope1ty- Servitudes § 4.5(2); Joyce 
Livestock, supra. 
4. Canyon Cove's Rights after Transfer of the Purchased Property 
Plainti ffs contend that as a result of the ROFR being apputtenant to the Purchased 
Property, Canyon Cove's sale of the Purchased Property to Burns extinguished Canyon Cove's 
ability to enforce the ROFR. Plaintiffs cite Section 8. 1 of the Restatement in support of their 
position. 
Because 'appurtenant' is de fined as allowing a benefit to be "used only in conjunction 
with ownersh ip or occupancy of a pa rticulai· parcel of land," Restatement (Third) of Property-
Servitudes § 1.5, Canyon Cove could not assert the benefit of the ROFR once it di vested itsel f' of 
the Purchased Property . Furthermore. Section 8.1 of the Restatement explains: 
A person who holds the benefit or a servitude under any provision of this 
Restatement has a legal right to enfo rce the servitude. Ownership o f land intended 
to benefi t from enforcement of the servitude is not a prerequisite to enforcement, 
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but a person who holds the benefit of a covenant in gross must establish a 
legitimate interest in enforcing the covenant. 
Restatement (Third) of Prope1ty (Servitudes) § 8. 1 (2000). Comment a. to Section 8.1 goes on to 
explain that ownership of land has not been required to enforce sei:vitudes because American 
comts have refused to follow English common law which disallowed the creation of servitudes 
with benefits in gross. This ru]e and explanation, however, presupposes that a party seeking to 
enforce a servitude without any ownership of land holds the servitude in gross. In this case, 
Canyon Cove held an appurtenant ROFR and not a ROFR in gros . 
Because Canyon Cove no longer has an interest in the Purchased Property, and Canyon 
Cove's interest in the ROFR was appurtenant to the Purchased Property and not held in gross, 
Canyon Cove's rights tmder the ROFR have been extinguished. 
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
Defendants' motion for reconsideration is denied. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATEDthis J:Odayof IYb.tv 2017. 
----------
E H. WATKINS, JR. 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 1-a day of Ma.rch 2017, I did send a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document upon the parties listed below by mailing with the 
correct postage thereon; by causing the same to be placed in the respective courthouse mailbox; 
or by causing the same to be hand-delivered. 
Dina L. Sallak 
CAREY PERKTNS LLP 
P.O. Box 51388 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Robert B. Burns 
PARSONS B EHLE & LATIMER 
800 W. Main Street, Suite 1300 
Boise, ID 83 702 
PENNY MANNING 
Clerk of the District Court 
Bonneville County, Idaho 
By QAC / 
Deputy~ -
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ION.NEVILLE COUNTY 
IOAHO FALLS. !OAHo 
2011 APR 21 PH 12: 51 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 




BURNS CONCRETE INC., and 
CANYON COVE DEVELOPMENT 
COMPANY, LLP, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-16-3413 
ORDER DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS ' 
REMAINING CLAIMS AS MOOT 
Plaintiffs, having moved this Court to dismiss their remaining claims as 
moot, and good cause appearing: 
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs' remaining claims are dismissed as moot 
and this action is DISMISSED, WITH PREJUDICE. 
ORDER DlSMISSING PLAINTIFFS' REMAINING CLAIMS AS MOOT - I 
RECEIVED 
APR 2 5 2017 
Per ____ _ 
95
( 
DATEDthi"'2l day ftr/, ( ll 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 12,.] day of A:::o~ 
\ l , I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER DISMISSING 
PLAINTIFFS' REMAINING CLAIMS AS MOOT by delivering the same to each of the 
following, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
Robert B. Bums 
PARSONS BEHLE & LA TIMER 
800 W. Main Street, Suite 1300 
Boise, Idaho 83 702 
Telephone (208) 562-4900 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Donald F. Carey 
Dina L. Sallak 
CAREY PERKINS LLP 
980 Pier View Drive, Suite B 
P. 0. Box 51388 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402-4918 
Telephone: (208) 529-0000 







U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Hand-Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile (208) 562-4901 
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Hand-Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile (208) 529-0005 
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50NNEVILLE COUNTY 
IOAHO FALLS, IOAHO 
2011 APR 27 PH f2: 51 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
NORA A. MULBERRY and TN 
PROPER TIES LLC, 
Case No. CV-16-3413 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BURNS CONCRETE INC., and 




JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: all pending matters in the 
above entitled case are hereby dismissed, with prejudice. 




APR 2 5 2017 
Pr ____ _ 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ·1.,] day of ttR nJ , \1 , I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT by delivering 
the same to each of the following, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
Robert B. Bums 
PARSONS B ERLE & LATIMER 
800 W. Main Street, Suite 1300 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone (208) 562-4900 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Donald F. Carey 
Dina L. Sallak 
CAREY PERKINS LLP 
980 Pier View Drive, Suite B 
P. 0. Box 51388 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402-4918 
Telephone: (208) 529-0000 








U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Hand-Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile (208) 562-4901 
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Hand-Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile (208) 529-0005 
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Robert B. Burns, !SB No. 3744 
PARSONS BEHLE & LA TIMER 
800 W. Main Street, Suite 1300 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Telephone: (208) 562-4900 
Facsimile: (208) 562-4901 
Email: rburns@parsonsbehle.com 
Attorneys for Defendants/ Appellants 
217 JUN-5 PH 1='15 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
NORA A. MULBERRY and 
TN PROPERTIES LLC, 
Plaintiffs/Respondents, 
V. 
BURNS CONCRETE, INC. , and CANYON 
COVE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, LLP, 
Defendants/ Appellants. 
Case No. CV-16-3413 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, NORA A. MULBERRY AND TN PROPERTIES 
LLC, AND THEIR ATTORNEYS: 
Donald F. Carey 
Dina L. Sallak 
Lindsey R. Romankiw 
Carey Perkins LLP 
980 Pier View Drive, Suite B 
P.O. Box 51388 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402-4918 
AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT. 
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OTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named appellants Burns Concrete, Inc. and Canyon Cove Development 
Company, LLP, appeal against the above named respondents to the Idaho Supreme Comt from the 
Judgment entered in the above entitled action on the 27th day of April 2017, the Honorable Dane H. 
Watkins, Jr., presiding. 
2. The appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court and the Judgment 
described in paragraph 1 above is appealabie under and pursuant to Rule 11 (a)(l) I.A.R. 
3. The appellants ' preliminary statement of the issues on appeal is as follows: 
a. Did the district court err in ruling that the right of first refusal at issue (the 
"ROFR") could not be assigned by the designated beneficiary Canyon Cove Development Company, 
LLP ("Canyon Cove") to Burns Concrete Inc. ("Burns Concrete")? 
b. Did the district court err in ruling that all of the rights of Canyon Cove under 
the ROFR were extinguished upon Canyon Cove' s purported assignment of the ROFR to Burns 
Concrete? 
4. No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
5. No reporter's transcript is requested. 
6. The appellants request the fo llowing documents to be included in the clerk's record, 
together with any additional documents automatically included under Rule 28(b)(l), I.A.R.: 
a. Verified Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, filed June 29, 2016; 
b. Answer, filed J uJy 22, 2016; 
c. Affidavit of Kirk Burns, filed September 8 2016 · 
d. Affidavit of Linda Wilkins filed September 8, 2016; 
e. Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, filed November 10, 2016 ; 
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2 [8 13 .002\4810-83 57-639 1 v i 
100
( ( 
f. Second Affidavit of Kirk Burns, filed February 15, 2017; 
g. Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motion for Reconsideration, filed 
March 20, 2017; 
h. Order Dismissing Plaintiffs' Remaining Claims as Moot, filed April 27, 2017; 
1. Judgment, filed April 27, 20 17; and 
J. This Notice of Appeal. 
7. NIA. 
8. I certify: 
a. NIA. 
b. NIA. 
c. That the estimated fee of $100.00 for preparation of the clerk's record has 
been paid. 
d. That the appellate filing fee in the amount of $129. 00 has been paid. 
e. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to 
Rule 20, I.A.R. 
DATED this 2nd day of June 2017. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL-3 
2 l813.002\48 10-8357-6391 vi 
PARSONS BERLE & LA TIMER 
..__,...__ 
By_ "'-------+-- ----------
Robe11 B. Bu , 
Attorneys for Defendants/ Appellants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 2nd day of June 2017, a true and correct copy of the within 
and foregoing instrument was served upon: 
Donald F. Carey 
Dina L. Sallak 
Lindsey R. Romankiw 
Carey Perkins LLP 
980 Pier View Drive, Suite B 
P.O. Box 51388 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402-4918 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 4 
218 13 .002\4810-8357-6391 v i 
0 U.S. Mail 
[g] Facsimile 
D Hand Delivery 
D Overnight Delivery 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
NORA A. MULBERRY and 
PROPERTI S LLC, 






BURNS CONCRETE, INC., and CANYON ) 




Case No. CV-2016-3413 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDERRE:ATTORNEYFEESAND 
COSTS 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Plaintiffs filed a Verified Complaint for Declaratory Judgment on June 29, 2016, asking 
this Court to determine whether an Undivided Right of First Refusal (ROFR) between it and 
Canyon Cove was void or non-binding. Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
on August 22, 2016. 
On November 10, 2016, this Court entered a Memorandum Decision and Order declaring 
that the ROFR was personal to the Mulberrys and Canyon Cove and that the ROFR was 
extinguished when Canyon Cove assigned it to Burns. The Memorandum Decision and Order 
also declared that the ROFR was not binding on the Mulberrys' heirs, successors, devisees, or 
assigns, as a result of the extinguishment. 
Defendants filed a Motion for Reconsideration on December 30, 2016. 
On March 20, 2017, this Court entered a Memorandum Decision and Order denying 
Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration. 
On April 25 2017, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Dismiss for Mootness of Remaining 
Claims, which this Court granted. 
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Judgment was entered on April 27, 2017, dismissing all pending matters with prejudice. 
On May 4 20 17 the parties submitted a Stipulation Extending Time for Defendants' 
Response to Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Costs. 
On May 10, 2017, Plaintiffs fi led a Motion for Costs and Attorney's Fee and a 
Memorandum of Costs. 
On June 6, 2017 Defendants filed a Motion of Defendant to Disallow Costs and 
Attorney Fees. 
On June 14, 2017 Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal. 
Defendants filed a Memorandum in Support of Motion of Defendants to Disallow Costs 
and Attorney Fees on June 30, 2017. 
Plaintiffs filed a Reply in Support of Motion for Costs and Attorney's Fees and Motion to 
Strike Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorneys Fees. 
II. STANDARD OF ADJUDICATION 
The decision whether to award attorney fees is left to the discretion of the district court. 
Berkshire Investments, LL v. Taylor, 153 Idaho 73 , 80, 278 P.3d 943 950 (2012)· Benneu v. 
Patrick, 152 fdaho 854 856,276 P.3d 726, 728 (2012). 
III. DISCUSSION 
Plaintiff: seek attorney fees and costs, totaling$ 11 ,933.50 under I.R. .P. 54(d)(l )(C) 
and Idaho Code§§ 10-1210 12-120(3) and 12-121. 
A. Timeliness of Motion to Disallow 
Plaintiffs argue that pursuant to the parties' tipulation Defendants had up until June 6, 
2017, to file obj ctions to Plaintiffs' motion for fi e and costs. Plaintiffs argu that because 





Defendants' memorandum in support of their motion to disallow fees was filed after June 6, 
201 7, it is untimely and should be struck. 
T.R.C.P. 54(d)(5) states: 
Within 14 days of service of a memorandum of costs, any party may object by 
filing and serving a motion to disallow part or all of the costs. The motion ... 
must be heard and determined by the court as other motions under these rules. 
Failure to timely object to the items in the memorandum of costs constitutes a 
waiver of all objections to the costs claimed. 
(Emphasis added). 
I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3) provides: 
(A) A written motion, affidavit(s) supporting the motion, memoranda or briefs 
supporting the motion, if any, . .. must be fi led with the court and served so as to 
be received by the parties at least 14 days prior to the day designated for hearing. 
(0) The moving party must indicate on the face of the motion whether oral 
argument is desired. /fa brief or memorandum is not filed with the motion. the 
motion must indicate on the face of the motion whether the party intends to file a 
brief or memorandum supporting the motion. 
(Emphasis added). 
As noted by Plaintiffs, the pa11ies agreed by stipulation that Defendants would have until 
June 6, 2017, "to file objections to any memorandum of costs and attorney fees Plaintiffs may 
file with the Court." Defendants' motion to disallow fees and costs was filed on June 6, 2017. 
Defendants' motion was timely under the terms of the stipulation. Defendants' memora11dum in 
support of the motion to di sallow was fil ed on June 30. 2017, twenty days prior to the July 20, 
2017, hearing date for the motion. Defendants filed the memora11dum in compliance with the 
time requirements set forth in the stipulation, I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3), and l.R.C.P. 54(d)(5). 
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B. Prevailing Party 
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs are not the prevailing party in this case under 
l.R.C.P. 54(d)( l )(B) and should not be awarded attorney fees. Defendants argue that 
Plainti ffs' complaint sought relief on three bases, under which this Court did not grant 
relief. They add that because the Judgment dismissed the case with prejudice, 
Defendants could not have received a more favorab le outcome and are, therefore, the 
prevailing party. Defendants cite Sanders v. Lan¾ford, 134 Idaho 322, 1 P.3d 823 (Ct. 
App. 2000), in support of their argument. 
"The determination of who is a prevailing party is comm itted to the sound 
discretion of the trial court, and we will not disturb that detem1ination absent an abuse of 
discretion." Bream v. Benscoter, 139 Idaho 364, 368, 79 P.3d 723, 727 (2003). 
In Sanders, Joan Sanders ran a temporary employment service. David Lankford, 
president and principal shareholder of Northwestern Parts Washer, Inc., signed a contract 
with Sanders, on behalf of Northwestern. After Northwestern failed to make payment on 
the contract, Sanders filed a complaint against Lankford seeking payments owed. Soon 
after Sanders filed the complaint, Lankford paid the amount owed and moved to dism iss 
Sanders's complaint. The magistrate granted Lankfo rd's motion to dismiss on the ground 
that by nan1ing Lankford instead of Northwestern, Sanders had failed to nan1e and serve 
the proper party. Lankford then fil ed a motion for fees. The magistrate denied 
Lankford's motion, stating that Lankford was not the prevailing party because the lawsuit 
had been brought as a result of Lankford's reticence to pay his debt. The district court 
affirmed the magistrate court and Lankford appealed to the Court of Appeals. 
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On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the magistrate's determination was inconsistent 
with the Ru le 54(d)(l)(B) prevailing party analysis. The Court stated: 
On the prevailing party issue, governing legal standards are provided by Idaho 
Rule of Civi l Procedure 54(d)(1 )(B), which states: 
ln detem1ining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled 
to costs, the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final 
j udgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the 
respective parties, whether there were multiple claims, multiple issues, 
cow1terclaims, third party claims, cross-claims, or other multiple or cross 
issues between the parties, and the extent to which each party prevailed 
upon each of such issue or claims. The trial court in its sound discretion 
may determine that a party to an action prevai led in part and did not 
prevail in part, and upon so finding may apportion the costs between and 
among the parties in a fair and equitable manner after considering a ll of 
the issues and claims involved in the action and the resultant judgment or 
judgments obtained. 
Thus, under l.R.C.P. 54( d)( 1 )(B), there are three principal factors the trial court 
must consider when determining which pru1y, if any, prevailed: ( ! ) the final 
judgment or result obtained in relation to the relief sought; (2) whether there were 
multiple claims or issues between the parties; and (3) the extent to which each of 
the parties prevailed on each of the claims or issues. Chadderdon, 104 Idaho at 
411 ,659 P.2d at 165. The result obtained may be the product of a court judgment 
or of a settlement reached by the parties. Jeny J. Joseph C L. U Assoc. , 117 Idaho 
at 557, 789 P.2d at 1148; Ladd v. Coats, 105 Idaho 250,254, 668 P.2d 126, 130 
(Ct.App.1983). 
In our view, the magistrate did not properly apply the criteria of Rule 54(d)( l )(B) 
in holding that Lankford was not the prevailing pruty. The magistrate's 
determination that Sanders failed to name the proper defendant and the dismissal 
of Sanders' complaint are not challenged on appeal. Sanders improperly named 
Lankford, individually, rather thru1 the corporation, Northwestern Pa1 s Washer, 
Inc., as the defendant. The magistrate recognized the distinction between the 
corporate entity responsible for the debt and the party sued on the debt. Lankford, 
in its dismissal order. The result obtained in this case was a dismissal of Sanders' 
action-the most favo rable outcome that could possibly be achieved by Lankford 
as defendant. There were not multiple claims or issues, but a single claim by 
Sanders fo r collection of an account receivable, on which Lankford was 
successful. 
Although the prevai ling party determination is discretionary in nature, this 
discretion must be exerci sed within the bounds of governing legal standards. 
Under some circumstances application of these standards requires a holding that 
one party is the prevailing party on a particular claim as a matter of law. Holmes 
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v. Holmes, 125 Idaho 784 788, 874 P.2d 595, 599 (Ct.App.1994). Thi i such a 
cas , for application of the Rule 54(d)(l)(B) factors can lead only to a conclusion 
that Lankford wa the prevailing paity. 
anders v. Lankford, 134 Idaho at 325-26, l P.3d at 826-27 (Ct. App. 2000) (emphasis 
add d). 
The facts in Sanders are distingui shable from those in this case. In Sanders, the 
plaintiff did not receive any relief through the lawsuit. Although anders recovered from 
Lankford, the recovery occurred extrajudicially. In the judicial proceedings Sanders 
complaint was dismissed as a result of her not naming or serving the proper party. 
In this case Plaintiffs brought an action for declaratory judgment, seeking the 
following relief: 
1. Finding that the Undivided Right of First Refusal i void or voidable for 
failure of consideration; 
2. Finding that the Undivided Right of First Refusal to Acquire Interest in 
Real Property is vo id based on equity given the unconscionable manner of its 
presentation; 
3. Finding that if not void based on failure of consideration or based on 
equity that its affect is limited to sales of the subject prope1t , and i in no wa 
binding on inter vivos gift tran fers or intestate succession owners of the affected 
prope11y· 
5. For other and further relief a the Court deems appropriate under the 
circumstances. 
Verified Complaint at 4. 
In th ir motion for ummary judgment, Plaintiffs sought a declaration that the ROFR was 
per onal to the parties· not binding on Mulberrys' h irs successors, devisee or assigns; and 
non-beneficial to Burns. This Court granted summary judgment to the Plaintiffs, holding that the 
ROFR was extinguished when Canyon ove assigned it to Bums. This Court also held that the 
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ROFR was not binding on Mulberrys heirs, successors, devisees, or assigns. Following this 
ourt s denial of Defendants' motion for reconsideration, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Dismiss for 
Mootness of Remaining Claims which this Court granted. This Court then entered Judgment, 
dismissing "all pending matters in the above entitled case." 
Paragraph 5 in Plaintiffs' Prayer for Reliefrequested: "For other an.d further relief as the 
ourt deems appropriate w1der the circumstances." Verified Complaint at 4. This ourt's 
declaration that the ROFR was extingui hed and non-binding was in accordance with the relief 
sought by Plaintiffs. Although Plaintiffs' complaint was, upon Plaintiffs' motion thereafter 
dismissed as moot, Defendants cannot be said to have prevailed in the matter. Plaintiffs 
ultimately received the result they sought-a determination that the ROFR was not assignable. 
Defendants argue that they could not have obtained a more favorable outcome than the dismissal 
of Plaintiffs' complaint. Defendants overlook, however that a more favorable outcome would 
have involved a declaration that the ROFR was assignable by Canyon Cove and binding on the 
Mulberrys their successors devisees and assigns. The fact that Defendants now appeal that 
determination indicates Defendants did not achieve the outcome they desired. Plaintiffs are the 
prevailing paity in this matter. 
C. Idaho Code § 10-1210 
"In any proceeding under this act the court may make such award of costs as may seem 
equitable and just." I.C. § 10-1210. "Idaho Code § 10-1210 does not provide authority to award 
attorney fees in a declaratory action. In Frei burger we held that other statutory provisions were 
available in a declaratory action for an award of attorney fees." Nat'l Union Fire In ·. Co. of 
Pittsburgh. P.A. v. Dixon, 141 Idaho 537, 542-43 112 P.3d 825, 830- 31 (2005) (citing 
Freiburger v. J-U-B Engineers, Inc. , Docket o. 30104, WL 674207 (March 24 2005 ). 
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Although Plaintiffs are entitled to recover costs under Idaho Code § 10-1210, that statute 
does not authorize the collection of attorney fees. 
D. Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) 
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, bill, 
negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of 
goods, wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction unless 
otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable 
attorney's fee to be set by the cour1, to be taxed and collected as costs. 
The term "commercial transaction" is defined to mean all transactions except 
transactions for personal or household purposes. The term "party" is defined to 
mean any person, partnership, corporation, association, private organization, the 
state of Idaho or political subdivision thereof. 
l.C. § 12-120(3). 
The parties agree that this case revolves around a commercial transaction. Plaintiffs, as 
the prevailing party, are entitled to attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3). 
E. Idaho Code§ 12-121 
In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the 
prevai ling party or parties when the judge finds that the case was brought, 
pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. This 
section shall not alter, repeal or amend any statute that otherwise provides 
for the award of attorney's fees. The term "party" or "parties" is defined to 
include any person, partnership, corporation, association, private 
organization, the state of Idaho or political subdivision thereof. 
I.C. § 12-121. 
This Court cannot conclude that Defendants defended this case frivolously, 
unreasonably or without foundation. Therefore, Plaintiffs are not entitled to attorney fees 
underldaho Code § 12-121. 
F. Amount of Fees 
If the com1 grants attorney fees to a party or parties in a civil action it must 
consider the fo llowing in detennining the amount of such fees: 
(A) the time and labor required; 
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(B) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; 
(C) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the 
experience and ability of the attorney in the particular field of law; 
(D) the prevailing charges for like work; 
(E) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; 
(F) the time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances 
of the case; 
(G) the amount involved and the results obtained; 
(H) the undesirability of the case; 
(I) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the 
client; 
(J) a wards in similar cases; 
(K) the reasonable cost of automated legal research (Computer 
Assisted Legal Research), if the court finds it was reasonably 
necessary ju preparing a paiiy's case; 
(L) any other factor which the court deems appropriate in the 
particular case. 
I.R.C.P . 54(e)(3). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has explained: 
"[T]he law is clearly settled that when awarding attorney fees in a civil 
action, the district court must consider the I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) factors, but 
need not make specific written findings on the various factors." Lee v. 
Nickerson, 146 Idaho 5, 11 , 189 P .3d 467,473 (2008) (citations omitted). 
This rule is based upon the text of Rule 54(e)(3), which sets forth the 
factors that " the trial court 'shall consider ... in determining the amount of 
such fees.' (Emphasis added.)" Brinkman v. A id Ins. Co. , 115 Idaho 346, 
351, 766 P.2d 1227, 1232 (1988) (quoting I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3)), overruled on 
other grounds by Greenough v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho, 142 
Idaho 589, 130 P.3d 1127 (2006). The plain language of the Rule "does 
not require written findings on each factor," and the court's "failure to 
specifically address each separate factor does not, by itself constitute a 
'clear manifest abuse of discretion. ' " Id. Thus, in the context of the 
district court's determination of the amount of fees, the absence of written 
findings does not, per se, demonstrate an abuse of discretion. 
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Poole v. Davis, 288 P.3d 821 , 824 (2012). 
Considering all of the I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) factors, this Court finds an award of 
$11,447.50 in attorney fees to be reasonable. 
G. Costs as a Matter of Right 
Plaintiffs request $266.00 in costs as a matter of right. This total is comprised of 
$221.00 in filing fees and $45 .00 in service fees. 
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C) provides: 
Costs as a Matter of Right. When costs are awarded to a party, that party is 
entitled to the following costs, actually paid, as a matter of right: 
(i) court filing fees; 
(ii) actual fees for service of any pleading or document in the action, 
whether served by a public officer or other person; 
I.R.C.P. 54. 
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C)(i) authorizes the $221.00 for Plaintiffs' filing fees. 
l.R.C.P. 54( d)(l )(C)(i) authorizes the $45.00 for Plaintiffs' service fees. 
Plaintiffs should be awarded $266.00 in costs as a matter ofright. 
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
This Court awards to Plaintiffs $1 1,447.50 in attorney fees and $226.00 in costs as a 
matter of right. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this ~ day of_~- ~ --.,.... 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this &7 day of Vu~ 2017, I did send a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document upon the partieisted below by mailing, with the 
correct postage thereon; by causing the same to be placed in the respective courthouse mailbox; 
or by causing the same to be hand-delivered. 
Dina L. Sallak 
CAREY PERKINS, LLP 
P.O. Box 51388 
Idaho Falls ID 83402 
Robert B. Burns 
PARSONS BEH LE & LATIMER 
800 W. Main Street, Suite 1300 
Boise ID 83702 
PENNY MANNING 
Clerk of the District Court 
Bonneville County, Idaho 
Byi ·~ 
Deputy Clerk 
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Case No. CV-2016-3413 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORI>ER RE: ATTORNEY FEES AND 
COSTS 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Plaintiffs filed a Verified Coinplai1lt for Declaratory Judgment on Jtme 29, 2016, askj_ng 
this Court to detem1ine whether an Undivided Right of First Refusal (ROFR) between it and 
Canyon Cove was void or non-binding. Plaintiffs filed a Motion fot Prutial Summary Judgment 
011 August 22) 2016. 
On November 10, 20 16, this Court entered a Memorandum Decision and Order declruing 
that the ROFR was personal to the Mulberrys and Canyon Cove and that the ROFR was 
extinguished when Canyon Cove assigned it to Bums. The Memorandum Decision and Order 
also declared that the ROFR was not binding on the Mulbenys ' heirs, successors, devisees; or 
assigns, as a result ofth.e extinguishment. 
Defendants filed a Motion for Reconsideration on December 30, 2016, 
On March 20, 2017: this Court entered a Memorandum Decision and Order denying 
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Robert B. Burns, ISB No. 3744 
P ARSO S BEHLE & LATIMER 
800 W. Main Street, Suite 1300 
Boise, ID 83 702 
Telephone: (208) 562-4900 
Facsimile: (208) 562-4901 
Emai I: rburns@parsonsbehle.com 
Attorneys for Defendants/ Appellants 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
NORA A. MU LB ERR Y and 
TN PROPERTIES LLC, 
Plaintiffs/Respondents, 
V. 
BURNS CONCRETE, INC., and CANYON 
COVE DEVELOPME T COMPANY, LLP, 
Defendants/ Appellants. 
Case No. CV-16-3413 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO THE ABOVE AMED RESPONDENTS, ORA A. MULBERRY AND TN PROPERTIES 
LLC, AND THEIR ATTORNEYS: 
Donald F. Carey 
Dina L. Sallak-Windes 
Lindsey R. Romankiw 
Carey Perkins LLP 
980 Pier View Drive, Suite B 
P.O. Box 51388 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402-4918 
A D THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT. 
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NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named appellants Bums Concrete, Inc. and Canyon Cove Development 
Company, LLP, appeal against the above named respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from the 
final Judgment entered in the above entitled action on the 27th day of April 2017, the Honorable 
Dane H. Watkins Jr., presiding. A copy of the Judgment being appealed is attached to this notice, 
together with a copy of the order subject to this appeal entered after said Judgment. 
2. The appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Judgment 
and post-Judgment order described in paragraph 1 above are appealable under and pursuant to I.A.R. 
11 (a)( 1) and (7). 
3. The appellants' preliminary statement of the issues on appeal is as follows: 
a. Did the Judgment effect the dismissal, with prejudice, of all of the 
respondent's claims against the appellants? 
b. Did the district court err in ruling that the right of first refusal at issue (the 
"ROFR' ) could not be assigned by the designated beneficiary Canyon Cove Development Company, 
LLP ("Canyon Cove") to Burns Concrete Inc. ("Bums Concrete")? 
c. Did the district court err in ruling that all of the rights of Canyon Cove under 
the ROFR were extinguished upon Canyon Cove's purported assignment of the ROFR to Burns 
Concrete? 
d. Did the district court en in ruling that the respondents were the prevailing 
parties in this litigation notwithstanding the dismissal, with prejudice, of all of their claims against 
the appellants. 
4. o order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
5. No reporter's transcript is requested. 
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6. The appellants request the following documents to be included in the clerk's record, 
together with any additional documents automatically included under I.A.R. 28(b)(l): 
a. Verified Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, filed June 29, 2016; 
b. Answer, filed July 22, 2016; 
c. Affidavit of Kirk Burns, fi led September 8, 2016; 
d. Affidavit of Linda Wilkins, filed September 8, 20 I 6; 
e. Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment, filed ovember 10, 2016; 
f. Second Affidavit of Kirk Burns, filed February 15 2017; 
g. Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Motion for Reconsideration, filed 
March 20, 2017; 
h. Order Dismissing Plaintiffs Remaining Claims as Moot, filed Ap1il 27, 2017; 
1. Judgment, filed April 27, 2017; 
J. Notice of Appeal, fi led June 5, 2017; 
k. Memorandum Decision and Order Re: Attorney Fees and Costs, filed July 27, 
2017· and 
l. This Amended Notice of Appeal. 
7. NIA. 
8. I certify: 
a. IA. 
b . NIA. 
c. That the estimated fee of $100 .00 for preparation of the clerk' s record has 
been paid. 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 
2 !813.002\4810-8357-639 1 v2 
118
( ( 
d. That the appellate filing fee in the amount of $129.00 has been paid. 
e. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to 
I.A.R. 20. 
DATED this I st day of August 2017. 
TIMER 
By;L-...:..,_ ___ -----1-JL._ _________ _ 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1st day of August 2017, a true and correct copy of the 
within and foregoing instrument was served upon: 
Donald F. Carey 
Dina L. Sallak-Windes 
Lindsey R. Romankiw 
Carey Perkins LLP 
980 Pier View Drive, Suite B 
P.O. Box 51388 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402-4918 
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL - 5 
21813.002\4810-8357-6391 v2 
□ U.S. Mail 
[:8J Facsimile 
D Hand Delivery 




I I 1'' 
,.. 
'' Or r:EVlLL.: COU t•: I~, 
!D AHO FALLS, IDAH .1 
2011 APR 27 PM 12: 58 
r THE DISTRJCT COURT or TITE EVE TH JUDI lAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF lDAHO IN AND FOR TH .. COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
ORA A. MULl3 RRY and T 
PROPER lE LLC, 
Plaintiffs 
vs . 
BURNS CONCRETE INC., and 
CANYO COVE DE -LOPME T 
COMPA Y, LLP, 
D fendants. 
Su reme C urt N . 4 S \ 1_ 
Case No. CV-16-3413 
JUDGiv1ENT 
JUDGMENT I ENTERED A FOLLOWS: all pending matters in the 
above entitled case are her by di s.missed, with prejudice. 
DA TED Lh is ii]_ day _ _._ _ __._..,. _ _ ~;..___·J~_ 
FJLED · ORIGINAL 
JUN 1 9 20!7 
JUDG E T- I 
_CE I 
APR 2 5 201 
P=1 -----
121
... . ,,.. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ·1.,] day of ft9-nl , \1 , I served a true and correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT by delivering 
the same to each of the following, by the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
Robert B. Bums 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
800 W. Main Street, Suite 1300 
Boise, Idaho 83702 
Telephone (208) 562-4900 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Donald F. Carey 
Dina L. Sallak 
CAREY PERKINS LLP 
980 Pier View Drive, Suite B 
P. 0. Box 51388 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402-4918 
Telephone: (208) 529-0000 








U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Hand-Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile (208) 562-4901 
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Hand-Delivered 
Overnight Mail 
Facsimile (208) 529-0005 
Cle~~ 
122
JUL/ 27/ 2017/ THU 04:31 PM FAX No . P. 001/0 12 
IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL OISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNEVILLE 
20t7 JUL 27 PM I: 25 
Y d T'Nf.' •···• ,~i -~•r ,,,.,)nr NORA A. MULBERR fill rr)_:' ';,:'( .· -~-:-:.'~ 1;!,\i:~JO.:J' .. 






BURNS CONCRETE, INC., 8lld CANYON ) 




Case No. CV-2016~3413 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND 
ORDER RE: ATTOR._NEY FEES AND 
COSTS 
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Plaintiffs filed a Verified Complaint for Declaratory Judgment on June 29, 2016, asking 
this Comt to determine whether fill Undivided Right of First Refusal (ROFR) between it and 
Canyon Cove was void or non-binding. Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
on Aug1.tst 22, 2016. 
On November 10, 2016, this Court entered a Memorandum Decision and Order declaring 
that the ROFR was personal to the Mulberrys and Canyon Cove and that the ROFR was 
extinguished when Canyon Cove assigned it to Bums. The Memorandum Decision and Order 
also declared that the ROFR was not binding on the Mulben-ys' heirs, successors, devisees, or 
assigns, as a result of the extinguishment. 
Defendants filed a Motion for Reconsideration on December 30, 2016. 
On March 20, 2017, this Court entered a Memorandum Decision and Order denying 
Defendants' Motion for Reconsideration. 
On April 25, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Dismiss for Mootness of Remaining 
Claims, which this Court granted. 
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Judgment was entered on April 27, 2017, dismissing all pending matters with prejudice. 
On May 4, 2017, the parties submitted a Stipulation Extending Time for Defendants' 
Response to Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Costs. 
On May 10, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Costs and Attorney's Fee and a 
Memorandum of Costs. 
On June 6, 2017, Defendants filed a Motion of Defendants to Disallow Costs and 
Attorney Fees. 
On June 14, 2017, Defendants filed a Notice of Appeal. 
Defendants filed a Memorandum in Support of Motion of Defendants to Disallow Costs 
and Attorney Fees on June 30, 2017. 
Plaintiffs filed a Reply in Support of Motion for Costs and Attorney's Fees and Motion to 
Strike Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorneys Fees. 
II. STAl~DARD OF ADJUDICATION 
Toe decision whether to award attorney fees is left to the discretion of the district comt. 
Berkshire Investments, LLC v. Taylor, 153 Idaho 73, 80, 278 P.3d 943, 950 (2012); Bennett v. 
Patrick, 152 Idaho 854,856,276 P.3d 726, 728 (2012). 
III. DISCUSSION 
Plaintiffs seek attorney fees and costs, totaling$ 11,933.50, under I.R.C.P, 54(d)(l)(C) 
and Idaho Code§§ 10-1210, 12-120(3) and 12-121. 
A. Timeliness of Motion to Disallow 
Plaintiffs argue that pursuant to the parties' stipulation, Defendants had up until June 6, 
2017, to file objections to Plaintiffs' motion for fees and costs. Plaintiffs argue that because 
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Defendants' memorandum in support of their motion to disallow fees was filed after June 6, 
201 7, it is untimely and should be struck. 
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(5) states: 
Within 14 days of service of a memorandum of costs, any party may object by 
filing and serving a motion to disallow part or all of the costs. The motion . , . 
must be heard and determined by the court as other motions under these rules. 
Failure to timely object to the items in the memorandum of costs constitutes a 
waiver of all objections to the costs claimed. 
(Emphasis added). 
I.R.C.P, 7(b)(3) provides: 
(A) A written motion, affidavit(s) supporting the motion, memoranda or briefs 
supporting the motion, if any, . . _ must be filed with the court and served so as to 
be received by the parties at least 14 days prior to the day designated for hearing. 
(D) The moving party must indicate on the face of the motion whether oral 
argument is desired. If a brief or memorandum is not filed with the motion, the 
motion must indicate on the face of the motion whether the party intends to file a 
brief or memorandum supporting the morion. 
(Emphasis added). 
As noted by Plaintiffs, the parties agreed by stipulation that Defendants would have until 
June 6, 2017, "to file objections to any memorandum of costs and attorney fees Plaintiffs may 
file with the Court." Defendants' motion to disallow fees and costs was filed on June 6, 2017. 
Defendants' motion was timely under the terms of the stipulation. Defendants' memorandum in 
support of the motion to disallow was filed on June 30, 2017, twenty days prior to the July 20, 
2017, hearing date for the motion. Defendants filed the memorandum in compliance with the 
time requirements set forth in the stipulation, I.R.C.P. 7(b)(3), and l.R.C,P. 54(d)(5). 
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B. Prevailing Party 
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs are not the prevailing party in this case under 
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B) and should not be awarded attorney fees. Defendants argue that 
Plaintiffs' complaint sought relief on three bases, under which this Court did not grant 
relief. They add that because the Judgment dismissed the case with prejudice, 
Defendants could not have received a more favorable outcome and are, therefore, the 
prevailing party. Defendants cite Sanders v. Lankford, 134 Idaho 322, 1 P.3d 823 (Ct. 
App. 2000), in support of their argument. 
P. 005/ 012 
HThe determination of who is a prevailing party is committed to the sound 
discretion of the trial court, and we will not disturb that detennination absent an abuse of 
discretion." Bream v. Benscoter, 139 Idaho 364, 368, 79 P.3d 723, 727 (2003). 
In Sanders, Joan Sanders ran a temporary employment service. David Lankford, 
president and principal shareholder of Northwestern Parts Washer, Inc., signed a contract 
with Sanders, on behalf of Northwestern. After Northwestern failed to make payment on 
the contract, Sanders filed a complaint against Lankford seeking payments owed. Soon 
after Sanders filed the complaint, Lankford paid the amount owed and moved to dismiss 
Sanders's complaint. The magistrate granted Lankford1s motion to dismiss on the ground 
that by naming Lankford instead ofNorthwestem, Sanders had failed to name and serve 
the proper party. Lankford then filed a motion for fees. The magistrate denied 
Lankford's motion, stating that Lankford was not the prevailing party because the lawsuit 
had been brought as a result of Lankford 's reticence to pay his debt. The district court 
affirmed the magistrate court and Lankford appealed to the Court of Appeals. 
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On appeal, the Comt of Appeals held that the magistrate's determination was inconsistent 
with the Rule 54(d)(l)(B) prevailing party analysis. The Court stated: 
On the prevailing party issue, governing legal standards are provided by Idaho 
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1 )(B), which states: 
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled 
to costs, the trial court shall in its sound discretion consider the final 
judgment or result of the action in relation to the relief sought by the 
respective parties, whether there were multiple claims, multiple issues, 
counterclaims, third party claims, cross-claims, or other multiple or cross 
issues between the parties, and the extent to which each party prevailed 
upon each of such issue or claims. The trial court in its sound discretion 
may determine that a party to an action prevailed in part and did not 
prevail in part, and upon so finding may apportion the costs between and 
among the parties in a fair and equitable manner after considering all of 
the issues and claims involved in the action and the resultant judgment or 
judgments obtained. 
Thus, under I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B), there are three principal factors the trial court 
must consider when determining which party, if any, prevailed: (1) the final 
judgment or result obtained in relation to the relief sought; (2) whether there were 
multiple claims or issues between the parties; and (3) the extent to which each of 
the parties prevailed on each of the claims or issues. Chaddetdon, I 04 Idaho at 
41 1> 659 P.2d at 165. The result obtained may be the product of a court judgment 
or of a settlement reached by the parties. Jerry J Joseph C.L. U Assoc., 117 Idaho 
at 557, 789 P.2d at 1148; Ladd v. Coats, 105 Idaho 250, 254, 668 P.2d 126, 130 
(Ct.App.1983). 
In our view, the magistrate did not properly apply the criteria of Rule 54(d)(l)(B) 
in holding that Lankford was not the prevailing party. The magistrate's 
determination that Sanders failed to name the proper defendant and the dismissal 
of Sanders' complaint are not challenged on appeal. Sanders improperly named 
Lankford, individually, rather than the corporation, Northwestern Parts Washer, 
Inc., as the defendant. The magistrate recognized the distinction between the 
corporate entity responsible for the debt and the party sued on the debt, Lankford, 
in its dismissal order. The result obtained in this case was a dismissal of Sanders' 
action-the most favorable outcome that could possibly be achieved by Lankford 
as defendant. There were not multiple claims or issues, but a single claim by 
Sanders for collection of an account receivable, on which Lankford was 
successful. 
Although the prevailing party determination is discretionary in nature, this 
discretion must be exercised within the bounds of governing legal standards. 
Under some circumstances application of these standards requires a holding that 
one party is the prevailing party on a particular claim as a matter of law. Holmes 
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v. Holmes, 125 Idaho 784, 788, 874 P.2d 595, 599 (Ct.App.1994). This is such a 
case, for application of the Rule 54(d)(l)(B) factors can lead only to a conclusion 
that Lankford was the prevailing party. 
Sanders v. Lankford, 134 Idaho at 325-26, 1 P.3d at 826-27 (Ct. App. 2000) (emphasis 
added). 
The facts in Sanders are distinguishable from those in this case. In Sanders, the 
plaintiff did not receive any relief through the lawsuit. Although Sanders recovered from 
Lankford, the recovery occurred extrajudicially. In the judicial proceedings, Sanders 
complaint was dismissed as a result of her not naming or serving the proper party. 
In this case, Plaintiffs brought an action for declaratory judgment, seeking the 
following relief: 
1. Finding that the Undivided Right of First Refusal is void or voidable for 
failure of consideration; 
2. Finding that the Undivided Right of First Refusal to Acquire Interest in 
Real Property is void based on equity given the unconscionable manner of its 
presentation; 
3. Finding that if not void based on failure of consideration or based on 
equity, that its affect is limited to sales of the subject property, and is in no way 
binding on inter vivas gift transfers or intestate succession owners of the affected 
property; 
5. For other and further relief as rhe Court deems appropriate under the 
circumstances. 
Verified Complaint at 4. 
In their motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs sought a declaration that the ROFR was 
personal to the parties; not binding on Mulberrys' heirs, successors, devisees, or assigns; and 
non-beneficial to Bums. This Court granted summary judgment to the Plaintiffs, holding that the 
ROFR was extinguished when Canyon Cove assigned it to Burns. Thls Court also held that the 
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ROFR was not binding on Mulberrys' heirs, successors, devisees, or assigns. Following this 
Court's denial of Defendants' motion for reconsideration, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Dismiss for 
Mootness of Remaining Claims, which this Court granted. This Court then entered Judgment, 
dismissing ''all pending matters in the above entitled case." 
Paragraph 5 in Plaintiffs' Prayer for Relief requested: "For other and further relief as the 
Court deems appropriate under the circUmstances." Verified Complaint at 4. Tius Court's 
declaration that the ROFR was extinguished and non-binding was in accordance with the relief 
sought by Plaintiffs. Although Plaintiffs' complaint was, upon Plaintiffs' motion, thereafter 
dismissed as moot, Defendants cannot be said to have prevailed in the matter. Plaintiffs, 
ultimately received the result they sought-a determination that the ROFR was not assignable. 
Defendants argue that they could not have obtained a more favorable outcome than the dismissal 
of Plaintiffs' complaint. Defendants overlook, however, that a more favorable outcome would 
have involved a declaration that the ROFR was assignable by Canyon Cove and binding on the 
Mulberrys, their successors, devisees and assigns. The fact that Defendants now appeal that 
determination indicates Defendants did not achieve the outcome they desired. Plaintiffs are the 
prevailing party in this matter. 
C. Idaho Code§ 10-1210 
"In any proceeding under this act the court may make such award of costs as may seem 
equitable and just." LC. § 10-1210. "Idaho Code § 10- 1210 does not provide authority to award 
attorney fees in a declaratory action. In Freiburger we held that other statutory provisions were 
available in a declaratory action for an award of attorney fees." Nat'! Union Fire Ins. Co. of 
Pittsburgh, P.A. v. Dixon, 141 Idaho 537, 542-43, 112 P.3d 825, 830-31 (2005) (citing 
Freiburger v. J-U-B Engineers, Inc., Docket No. 30104, WL 674207 (March 24, 2005)). 
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Although Plaintiffs are entitled to recover costs under Idaho Code§ 10-1210, that statute 
does not authorize the collection of attorney fees. 
D. Idaho Code § 12-120(3) 
In any civil action to recover on an open account, account stated, note, bill, 
negotiable instrument, guaranty, ot contract relating to the purchase or sale of 
goods, wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction unless 
otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable 
attorney's fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs. 
The term "commercial transaction'' is defined to mean all transactions except 
transactions for personal or household purposes. The term ''party" is defined to 
mean any person, partnership, corporation, association, private organization, the 
state ofidaho or political subdivision thereof. 
I.C. § 12-120(3). 
The parties agree that this case revolves around a commercial transaction. Plaintiffs, as 
the prevailing party, are entitled to attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3). 
E. Idaho Code § 12-121 
In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the 
prevailing party or parties when the judge finds that the case was brought, 
pursued or defended frivolously, uru·easonably or without foundation. This 
section shall not alter, repeal or amend any statute that otherwise provides 
for the award of attorney's fees. The term "party" or ''parties" is defined to 
include any person, partnership, corporation, association, private 
organization, the state of Idaho or political subdivision thereof. 
This Court cannot conclude that Defendants defended this case frivolously, 
unreasonably or without foundation. Therefore, Plaintiffs are not entitled to attorney fees 
under Idaho Code§ 12-121. 
F. Amount of Fees 
If the court grants attorney fees to a party or parties in a civil action it must 
consider the following in dete1mining the amount of such fees: 
(A) the time and labor required; 
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(B) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; 
(C) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly and the 
experience and ability of the attorney in the particular field of law; 
(D) the prevailing charges for like work; 
(E) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; 
(F) the time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances 
of the case; 
(G) the amount involved and the results obtained; 
(H) the undesirability of the case; 
(I) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the 
client; 
(J) awards in similar cases; 
(K) the reasonable cost of automated legal research (Computer 
Assisted Legal Research), if the court finds it was reasonably 
necessary in preparing a party's case; 
(L) any other factor which the court deems appropriate in the 
particular case. 
LR.C.P. 54(e)(3). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has explained: 
"[T]he law is clearly settled that when awarding attorney fees in a civil 
action, the district court must consider the I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) factors, but 
need not make specific written findings on the various factors." Lee v. 
Nickerson, 146 Idaho 5, 11, 189 P.3d 467,473 (2008) (citations omitted). 
This mle is based upon the text of Ru.le 54(e)(3), which sets forth the 
factors that "the trial court 'shall consider ... in determining the amount of 
such fees.) (Emphasis added.)" Brinkman v. Aid Ins. Co., 115 Idaho 346, 
351, 766 P.2d 1227, 1232 (1988) (quoting I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3)), overruled on 
other grounds by Greenough v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho, 142 
Idaho 589, 130 P.3d 1127 (2006). The plain language of the Rule "does 
not require written findings on each factor," and the court's "failure to 
specifically address each separate factor does not, by itself constitute a 
'clear manifest abuse of discretion.' " Id. Thus, in the context of the 
district court's determination of the amount of fees, the absence of written 
findings does not, per se, demonstrate an abuse of discretion. 
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Poole v. Davis, 288 P.3d 821, 824 (2012). 
Considering all of the LR.C.P. 54(e)(3) factors, this Court finds an award of 
$11,447.50 in attomey fees to be reasonable. 
G. Costs as a Matter of Right 
Plaintiffs request $266.00 in costs as a matter of right. This total is comprised of 
$221.00 in filing fees and $45.00 in service fees. 
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1 )(C) provides: 
Costs as a Matter of Right. When costs are awarded to a party, that party is 
entitled to the following costs, actually paid, as a matter of right: 
(i) court filing fees; 
(ii) actual fees for service of any pleading or document in the action, 
whether served by a public officer or other person; 
I.R.C.P. 54. 
I.R.C.P. 54(d)(l)(C)(i) authorizes the $221.00 for Plaintiffs, filing fees. 
I.R.C.P. 54( d)(l )(C)(i) authorizes the $45 .00 for Plaintiffs' service fees, 
Plaintiffs should be awarded $266.00 in costs as a matter of right. 
IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER 
P. Oll / 0!2 
This Court awards to Plaintiffs $11 ,447.50 in attoroey fees and $226.00 in costs as a 
matter of right. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this~ day of __ ..,,.._=--'-'d-:----+-
MEMORANDUM DECJSION AND ORDER RE: .ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS- 10 
133
JUL/ 27/2017/ THU 04:35 PM FAX No. P. 012/ 012 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this (Y, 7 day of Q U ~ 2017, I did send a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document upon the partie ~ sted below by mailing, with the 
correct postage thereon; by causing the same to be placed in the respective courthouse mailbox; 
or by causing the same to be hand-delivered. 
Dina L. S allak 
CAREY P ERKINS, LLP 
P.O. Box 51388 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
Robert B. Burns 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATfMER 
800 W. Main Street, Suite 1300 
Boise, ID 83702 
PENNY MANNING 
Clerk of the District Court 
Bonneville County, Idaho 
By])·~ 
Deputy Clerk 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) 
County of Bonneville ) 
Case No. CV-2016-3413 
Docket No. 45184 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATION 
OF EXHIBITS 
I, Penny Manning, Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State 
of Idaho, in and for the County of Bonneville, do hereby certify that the foregoing Exhibits were 
marked for identification and offered in evidence, admitted, and used and considered by the 
Court in its determination: 
No exhibits were admitted 
And I further certify that all of said Exhibits are on file in my office and are part of this 
record on Appeal in this cause, and are hereby transmitted to the Supreme Court. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the 
District Court thisJE._ day of October, 2017. 
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STATE OF IDAHO 




Case No. CV-2016-3413 
Docket No. 45184 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
I, Penny Manning, Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State 
of Idaho, in and for the County of Bonneville, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing 
Record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound under my direction and is a true, 
correct and complete Record of the pleadings and documents as are automatically required under 
Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
I do further certify that all exhibits, offered or admitted in the above-entitled cause, will 
be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court along with the Court Reporter's Transcript 
(if requested) and the Clerk's Record as required by Rule 31 of the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand affixed the seal of the District 
Court this ,Way of October, 2017. 
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Case No. CV-2016-3413 
Docket No. 45184 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~ day of October, 2017, I served a copy of the 
Reporter's Transcript (ifrequested) and the Clerk's Record in the Appeal to the Supreme Court in 
the above entitled cause upon the following attorneys: 
Lindsey Romankiw 
980 Pier View Drive, Suite B 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402-2913 
Robert Burns 
800 W. Main Street, Suite 1300 
Boise, ID 83702 
by depositing a copy of each thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, in an envelope 
addressed to said attorneys at the foregoing address, which is the last address of said attorneys 
known to me. 
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